Casebooks and Constitutional Competency by Engdahl, David E.
REVIEWS
Casebooks and Constitutional Competency
David E. Engdahl*
I. INTRODUCTION
The first law school casebook in constitutional law was published
in 1895 by Harvard law professor James Bradley Thayer.1 Thayer
observed that every teacher, "has his own gifts or lack of
gifts,-methods as incommunicable as his temperament, his looks, or
his manners."2  He distinguished, however, between how teachers
might manage the classroom and how students must prepare them-
selves:
[a]s to modes of study, a very different matter, Dean Langdell's
associates have all come to agree ... that there is no method of
preparatory study so good as the one with which his name is so
honorably connected,-that of studying cases, carefully chosen and
arranged so as to present the development of principles.'
The case method of law study, however, has changed a great deal
since Langdell's time, not only because the quantity of cases (and other
important materials) has exponentially increased, but also because the
competency expected of lawyers today requires even more critical
inclinations, less acquiescence in accustomed forms, perhaps a more
skeptical disposition, and greater skills not only of understanding, but
of refinement, adjustment, growth, and creative use.
In addition, constitutional law itself has dramatically grown, both
in scope and in complexity. Reflecting (and in turn, no doubt,
contributing to) the more activist orientation familiar since the Warren
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1. 2 JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1895).
2. Id. at vi.
3. Id.
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Court, casebook editors since the late 1950s have included suggestions
and questions calculated to induce students to challenge, to connect, to
critique, and to explore more intensively and more extensively than had
been commonplace before. Today's casebooks are thus far better
adapted for fostering constitutional competency among lawyers than
were their earlier counterparts.4
4. If we assume that casebooks influence students' learning, hence their thinking, and thus
their professional lives and their contributions to our society, whether casebooks do their jobs well
or poorly can be of enormous significance.
We might wish, however, to accept less responsibility. This point is made well (and with
humor) in an exchange of letters I had with Gerald Gunther when I returned to teaching in 1981
after an interlude in practice. I wrote saying I was teaching from his casebook, as I had
sometimes done before, and said:
Returning to the subject after some absence, however, I am reading the materials with
a degree of care which had lapsed somewhat when I was so familiar with them before.
Thus it is that I have found a remarkable typographical error which not only may
amuse you, but may provide a point of take-off for brief discussion in your classes, as
it will in mine.
On page 5 of your 10th edition, in the text of Marbury v. Madison, appears this
sentence:
The conclusion from this reasoning is, that where the heads of departments are the
political or confidential agents of the executive, merely to execute the will of the
President, or rather to act in cases in which the executive professes a constitutional
or legal discretion, nothing can be more perfectly clear than that their acts are only
politically examinable.
The italicized word, for reasons which in this day should not be difficult to discern,
puzzled me; and I therefore went back and checked the original U.S. Reports. The
word in the original is, in fact, as I had thought, "possesses." The significance of the
difference is so plain that it requires no comment.
This typographical error, I find on checking old editions, has been present
consistently at least as far back as your 7th edition with Dowling; I am amused by
wondering whether the same error might have appeared in Professor Dowling's earlier
editions, including the one that Dick Nixon might have used when he went to law
school.
Professor Gunther replied promptly and with his accustomed modesty, cordiality, and good
humor, saying:
A letter such as yours should ordinarily bring chagrin and embarrassment, and to some
extent it does: I know of no similar error in the book, and I strongly suspect (though
after this episode I wouldn't want to swear to it) that Marbury is the only case in the old
Dowling book I did not reedit from scratch. But I laughed too hard at the irony of that
mistake to really be moved to tears. "Professes" indeed: I am really tempted to keep
it in not only for my next basic constitutional law course, but for the life of the book.
At least so long as executive power advocates such as Nixon live in memory (or infamy)
it really is too delicious a slip to omit. Of course, I would have to put out a Teachers'
manual to inform the uninitiated (which, until today, included me), and that is a task
I have always avoided.
Thanks so much for calling it to my attention. I suspect, though I have not yet
checked, that the error does indeed go back to the days in which Nixon was a law
student. The thought is horrifying. If Nixon was indeed as good and obedient a law
student as he is reputed to have been, the blame may lie with a constitutional law
professor. At least it was Dowling, not me. And I console myself with the fact that we
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Yet I find them all deficient regarding one branch of constitutional
law which already is resurgent and will surely develop further as the
new millennium proceeds. The casebooks do not provide students the
resources and insights required for the critical understanding,
competent use, and beneficent development of basic elements of
federalism law, particularly the principle of enumerated powers.
Reflecting the dated sophistication that "intrinsic" constitutional limits
on federal legislative power are passe, the casebooks give little
significant instruction in the difficulties and possibilities of intelligently
accomplishing substantial decentralization of governmental discretion
and authority so as to enhance self-governance and liberty-the most
important reasons for having a constitution at all.
Part 1 of this Article traces the evolution of the constitutional law
casebook from Thayer's massive compilation of raw data in the
Langdell tradition, to the modern style of extensively edited cases with
comments and questions to help students identify, anticipate, and
assess potential avenues of analysis and development.
Part 2 examines some basic concepts of federalism law still
afforded too little attention by casebook editors. The classic analysis
of enumerated powers (including Congress' power under the necessary
and proper clause) was eclipsed a century ago by the rise of the
misconceptions now commonly generalized as "dual federalism."
Justice Stone led a revival of the classic approach beginning in 1937;
but just as its operation under modern conditions was beginning to be
made clear, Justice Black set a contrary course which led to federalism
issues being treated for decades less as issues of law than as political
questions. Part 3 details those developments, and Part 4 then discusses
the challenge and opportunity facing casebooks now that federalism has
attracted renewed judicial interest and constitutional opinion teeters
between refining the viable, classic constitutional analysis of federal
legislative power, and falling back on the old, discredited dual
federalism idea.
no doubt tend to give too much credit to the influence we have as teachers.
(correspondence of David Engdahl, Professor, Seattle University School of Law, with Gerald
Gunther, Professor, Stanford Law School, (Aug. 31 and Sept. 4, 1981) (on file with the Seattle
University Law Review).
I did later ascertain that not even Dowling can be blamed for any transgressions of Mr.
Nixon. Although the error has been present from the first time Dowling included the relevant
paragraph from Marbury in his book at all, it was never included until his fourth edition, in 1950.
Nixon, however, had finished law school thirteen years earlier, in 1937-months, in fact, before
Dowling'sfirst edition even appeared. None of the earlier casebooks by others had included that
paragraph, either. Thus, Dowling as well as the other casebook editors are exonerated, no matter
which casebook Nixon might have used!
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II. PART 1: EVOLUTION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW CASEBOOK
A. The Present Proliferation
Faculty teaching law school courses in constitutional law have a
larger selection of casebooks to choose from today than ever before.
The twelve current choices constitute half the titles ever published for
law school use in this field. Until 1986 there were still only seven;
until 1975 the most there ever had been at one time was five.
Of the twelve currently offered, three appeared in new editions in
1997' or 19986. One appeared for the first time in 1996, 7 when new
editions of five others also appeared.8 The other debuted a new
edition in 1993 or 1992.'
Three of the twelve current titles can be traced, through several
editions and a succession of author-editors, to 1964,10 1959,11 and
193712 respectively. However, only two of the other nine existed
before 1981, and none of them existed before 1975. Five are new
within the past twelve years.
In contrast, just one new constitutional law casebook for law
schools was introduced during the entire fifteen-year period of 1960
through 1974, even though at that time the profession (and certainly
the law professoriat) was enthralled and preoccupied with constitutional
5. GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (13th ed.
1997); WILLIAM COHEN & JONATHAN D. VARAT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW (10th ed. 1997); RONALD D. ROTUNDA, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
CASES AND NOTES (5th ed. 1997).
6. DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
THEMES FOR THE CONSTITUTION'S THIRD CENTURY (2d ed. 1998); DAVID CRUMP ET AL.,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (3d ed. 1998).
7. DONALD E. LIVELY ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES, HISTORY, AND
DIALOGUES (1996).
8. JEROME A. BARRON ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY,
CASES AND MATERIALS (5th ed., 1996); DAAN BRAVEMAN ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
STRUCTURE AND RIGHTS IN OUR FEDERAL SYSTEM (3rd ed., 1996); WILLIAM B. LOCKHART
ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES - COMMENTS - QUESTIONS (8th ed. 1996); GEOFFREY
R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (3rd ed. 1996); NORMAN REDLICH ET AL.,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (3rd ed. 1996).
9. PAUL BREST & SANFORD LEVINSON, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION-
MAKING: CASES AND MATERIALS (3rd ed. 1992).
10. LOCKHART ET AL., supra note 8 (originally WILLIAM B. LOCKHART, YALE KAMISAR
& JESSE H. CHOPER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES - COMMENTS - QUESTIONS (1964)).
11. COHEN & VARAT, supra note 5 (originally EDWARD L. BARRETT, JR., PAUL W.
BRUTON & JOHN HONNOLD (1959)).
12. GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 5 (originally NOEL T. DOWLING, CASES ON
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1937)).
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events of the Warren court and the Nixon era. One might be tempted
to attribute the dearth of new entries during that period, compared to
the last fifteen years, to the quality of the competition already in place.
However, the 1996 and 1997 editions of the three survivors from that
period maintain their high quality, and yet now contend with nine
others. The plethora thus does not seem attributable to any decline in
the stalwarts. Perhaps it is just that law school market growth has
induced more publishing houses to seek market share with books of
their own;13 and perhaps a shrinking market might eventually squeeze
out one or two. In any event, the variety available now to satisfy
pedagogical tastes is unprecedented.
B. Thayer's Tomes
Constitutional law has been a staple of the law school curriculum
for only about sixty or seventy years.14 Langdell's model at Harvard
gave the subject no place. Even after 1878, when the law degree
course was extended to three years, the subject was not included.15
Near the end of the century, however, James Bradley Thayer developed
it as a third-year elective. 16 Constitutional law remained an elective
at Harvard even after the curriculum reforms undertaken during the
administration of Dean Landis in the late 1930s. 7
Thayer hoped the casebook he published in 1895 would "help to
promote a deeper, more systematic, and exacter study of this most
13. During the 1960s and 1970s, the market belonged to West, Foundation, and Little,
Brown, until Bobbs-Merrill's introduction of the Barron & Dienes book in 1975. Today, in
addition to West with three, Foundation with two, and Little, Brown's successor Aspen with two,
Matthew Bender vies with three entries, and Michie and Anderson with one apiece.
14. In earlier decades academic law schooling had typically included attention to
constitutional law in the broad sense typified by Story's Commentaries on the Constitution,
including considerable emphasis on matters of structure and government organization. See
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITES STATES (Boston,
Little, Brown and Co. 1833). By the Civil War, however, that had been generally crowded out
by the increasing time demands of private law subjects on the typical one or two years of law
degree study. See ALFRED Z. REED, TRAINING FOR THE PUBLIC PROFESSION OF THE LAW
171, 296, 349 (1921). For the remainder of the nineteenth century, with a few exceptions, in
those law schools where the subject was taught at all, its scope was restricted to the issues of
constitutional limitation elaborated by Professor and Michigan Supreme Court Justice Thomas
M. Cooley in his popular TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST
UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION (Boston, Little,
Brown and Co. 1868). See also REED, supra, at 302 and 296.
15. REED, supra note 14, at 379.
16. See JOSEPH REDLICH, THE COMMON LAW AND THE CASE METHOD IN AMERICAN
UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOLS 46 (1914).
17. See James Bradley Thayer, The New Curriculum of the Harvard Law School, 51 HARV.
L. REv. 965, 980-981 (1938).
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interesting and important subject, too much neglected by the profes-
sion. '"18 It was an enormous, two-volume compilation totaling 2,420
pages 9 and containing hundreds of principal cases, both state and
federal. Because he reproduced the opinions nearly full-length, the
volumes had to be printed in eye-straining small type. Annotations
containing excerpts from many additional cases, some explanatory
notes, and a few extensive selections from scholarly articles (most
notably Thayer's own) were set in even smaller type. Part One of the
collection, which had first appeared the previous year shortly after
Thayer's classic article, "The Origin and Scope of the American
Doctrine of Constitutional Law,"2 included a good deal of historical
and other secondary material about constitutions in general and about
the judiciary's function and role.
The daunting bulk of Thayer's book exemplifies the extraordinary
demands the undiluted Langdell case method placed upon students.
Thayer wrote that in preparing the collection "I have had chiefly in
mind the wants of my own classes at the Harvard Law School" as well
as "students elsewhere who follow similar methods of study,"'" and
he explained that he wanted the student "to see the topic grow and
develop under his eye":
Nothing else can bring home to a student ... the scope of the
questions presented, and the true limitations of the legal principles
that govern them, with anything like the freshness, precision, and
force, and I might add also the fascination, which accompany the
orderly tracing of these things in the cases.
... [T]here is no method of preparatory study so good as...
that of studying cases, carefully chosen and arranged so as to present
the development of principles.22
Thayer also wished to convey "the existence and the nature of' the
constitutional lawmaking process. He said:
The study of Constitutional Law is allied not merely with history,
but with statecraft, and with the political problems of our great and
complex national life.
In this wide and novel field of labor our judges have been
pioneers. There have been men among them, like Marshall, Shaw,
18. 2 THAYER, supra note 1, at v.
19. Thayer explained, "I have preferred to make the two volumes as large as they could well
be, with any regard to convenient use, and to pack them closely, rather than to take the much
easier course of letting the work run over into three or four volumes." Id.
20. 7 HARV. L. REv. 129 (1893).
21. 2 THAYER, supra note 1, at v.
22. Id. at vi.
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and Ruffin, who were sensible of the true nature of their work and
of the large method of treatment which it required, who perceived
that our constitutions had made them, in a limited and secondary
way, but yet a real one, coadjutors with the other departments in the
business of government; but many have fallen short of the require-
ments of so great a function. Even under the most favorable
circumstances, in dealing with such a subject as this, results must
often be tentative and temporary. Views that seem adequate at the
time, are announced, applied, and developed; and yet, by and by,
almost unperceived, they melt away in the light of later experience,
and other doctrines take their place.23
What Thayer demanded of law students, however, differed only
in degree from what he considered to be required of law teachers. As
Chair of the American Bar Association Section of Legal Education, he
said,
[E]very man who proposes really to understand any topic ... must
search out that one topic through all its development. Such an
investigation calls for much time, patience, and labor, but it brings
an abundant harvest in the illumination of every comer of the
subject ... "
23. Id. at v-vi.
Compare these observation about the Langdell case method generally, as employed in
common law courses.
Under the old method law is taught to the hearer dogmatically as a compendium of
logically connected principles and norms, imparted ready made as a unified body of
established rules. Under Langdell's method these rules are derived, step by step, by the
students themselves by a purely analytical process out of the original material of the
common law, out of the cases; a process which forbids the a priori acceptance of any
doctrine or system either by the teacher or by the hearer.
REDLICH, supra note 16, at 13.
If the student were given only cases which, from the instructor's point of view, were
correctly decided, the study of cases would be more like the use of a text-book,
containing illustrations of principles; but even then the case system would offer this
distinct advantage, that the student would be required to express in his own language
the material facts in the case, and the exact principle which the court considered
necessary to the decision thereof, whereas in the text-book system, if the author has
been successful in his work, the student finds it done for him. In truth, however, the
attempt is made, in selecting cases for the use of the student, to present the same
principle from many points of view, as involved in the same or different facts, and as
considered by different minds, and the decision may be good or bad in principle, and
may or may not be recognized as law. The student is thereby forced not only to analyze
cases, but to compare them, to discriminate and choose between them.
William A. Keener, The Inductive Method in Legal Education, 17 REP. A.B.A. 473, 482-483
(1894).
24. James Bradley Thayer, The Teaching of English Law at Universities, 9 HARV. L. REV.
169, 177, 178 (1895).
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The law teacher, he said, "to put himself in a position to explain it to
others, in his own field of study must explore ... all the decided cases
relating to it."'2 Of course the law student, just beginning his study,
and taking on several subjects at once, must for practical reasons be
limited to the relatively few cases a teacher had carefully selected; but
those cases were to be given to the student essentially in their raw
state, requiring each student to devote the same kind of time-intensive"patience and labor" to bring in the harvest Thayer promised.
Afterwards, in the classroom, there might be some help in weighing
and grinding the grain, depending of course on the teacher's "gifts or
lack of gifts"; but in preparing for class the student was left with only
the cases-and his own time and talents-to gather the sheaves and
separate the wheat from the chaff.
"[W]hile good teaching will differ widely in its methods," Thayer
observed, "there is at least one thing in which all good teaching will be
alike; no teaching is good which does not rouse and 'dephlegmatize' the
students, . . . which does not engage as its allies, their awakened,
sympathetic, and cooperating faculties. ' 26  He continued, "[a]s
helping to that, as tending to secure for an instructor this chief element
of success, I do not think that there is or can be any method of study
which is comparable with the one in question. ' 27
There was more demand for practicing lawyers, however, than
there were students sufficiently capable and patient to realize Thayer's
Langdellian ideal. Indeed, case-method law teaching in general did not
achieve dominance until Langdell's model of massing barely edited
cases had been moderated some by successors.28 In 1901, when he
was seventy years old, Thayer recorded his intention to prepare "a
small Vol. on Const. Law"29 once his second volume on evidence was
done. Just five months later, however, death intervened.
25. Id. "[T]he competent teacher of law must carefully and minutely explore the history
and development of his subject." Id. at 178.
26. 2 THAYER, supra note 1, at vii.
27. Id.
28. Thayer did note that, "[in order to keep this collection within the compass of two
volumes and yet do anything like justice to the subject," he had departed in one respect from the
standard Langdell format. "[I]t has been necessary," he said, "almost always, to omit the
arguments of counsel." Id.
29. See ARTHUR E. SUTHERLAND, THE LAW AT HARVARD 210 (1967).
[Vol. 21:741
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C. Hall, Evans, and Others Before the New Deal
Not until 1913 did there appear any alternative to Thayer's
enormous tomes for teaching constitutional law by the case method.
In that year, University of Chicago Law School Dean James Parker
Hall's casebook was published.3" Although Hall found it "peculiarly
difficult adequately to cover the subject of Constitutional Law by
selected cases within the compass of a single manageable volume,"31
his coverage was admirable. His book had little more than half as
many pages as Thayer's, even though it was printed in slightly larger
type. Its several hundred cases (again, both state and federal) included
not only many from the intervening years, but even a few earlier ones
Thayer had excluded.32 Hall's book was also more heavily endowed
with annotations. He fit all of this within 1400 pages by editing the
opinions more severely than Thayer (although still far less than has
since become standard).
Hall explained the pedagogical principle underlying his collection
this way:
The principles of many legal topics may be stated or exemplified
with a definiteness denied to those of Constitutional Law ...
Government is not a simple matter, and the doctrines that would
limit it form a fascinating complex of history, law, and politics.
Every word of the most carefully phrased abstraction must be made
flesh in a hundred concrete examples before the living principle is
revealed. Here, as in other fields of practical judgment, there is "an
intuition of experience which outruns analysis and sums up many
unnamed and tangled impressions." To secure a sound basis for
such an intuition in the student's mind nothing can take the place
of the consideration of a multitude of instances and much and varied
reasoning and discussion."
At law schools where even Hall's book seemed too large and
unchewed, an alternative (if constitutional law was offered at all) was
to teach by textbook and lecture supplemented with a selection of cases
for illustration and discussion. In 1898, Chicago political scientist Carl
Evans Boyd published "a suitable casebook of moderate size,"34 about
30. JAMES PARKER HALL, CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW SELECTED FROM
DECISIONS OF STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS (1913).
31. Id. at xi.
32. E.g., United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876); Fort Leavenworth RY. Co. v.
Lowe, 114 U.S. 525 (1885).
33. HALL, supra note 30, at xi.
34. CARL EVANS BOYD, CASES ON AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW iii (1898).
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a quarter as large as Thayer's behemoth. Its 667 pages contained just
63 cases, and almost nothing in the way of annotating notes or
synopses of other cases or materials. However, it was designed not for
law schools, but "to form the basis of a university course in that
subject."3 A similar collection of 64 cases was published in 1916 by
Lawrence Boyd Evans, who had been head of the Tufts College
department of history and public law before attending the Harvard
Law School.16 His book "found considerable favor in college class-
es," 37 but seems not to have seen much use in law schools.
As more law schools came to include constitutional law in their
curricula, however, West Publishing Company included the subject in
its "Hornbook Case Series." A limited number of cases from Hall's
large collection (and later from its 1926 supplement) was published as
Illustrative Cases on Constitutional Law, 8 a volume designed for use
with Henry Campbell Black's constitutional law Hornbook which went
through several editions in the teens and the 1920s. The publisher's
preface explained the purpose of the Illustrative Cases series:
The object of these Casebooks is to illustrate the principles of law
as set forth and discussed in the volumes of the Hornbook Series.
The text-book sets forth in a clear and concise manner the principles
of the subject; the Casebook shows how these principles have been
applied by the courts, and embodied in the case law. . . . Unlike
casebooks prepared for the "Case Method" of instruction, no
attempt has been made to supply a comprehensive knowledge of the
subject from the cases alone. It should be remembered that the
basis of the instruction is the text-book, and that the purpose of
these Casebooks is to illustrate the practical application of the
principles of the law.39
The case method of study, however, was ascendant. In 1939, West
would publish another constitutional law Hornbook with an accompa-
nying volume of Illustrative Cases,4" but then the genre disappeared.
35. Id. Having only about one-fifth the number of Thayer's principal cases, Boyd's book
was less suited to the goal Thayer had set for a law school course, instilling an appreciation of "the
existence and the nature of' the process of constitutional jurisprudence.
36. LAWRENCE BOYD EVANS, LEADING CASES ON AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
(1st ed. 1916).
37. LAWRENCE BOYD EVANS, LEADING CASES ON AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
v-vii (2d ed. 1925).
38. JAMES PARKER HALL, ILLUSTRATIVE CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2d ed.
1927).
39. HALL, supra note 38, at v.
40. The 1939 Hornbook and volume of illustrative cases were by Professor Henry
Rottshaefer of Minnesota, whose earlier casebook in the CCH University Casebook Series and
[Vol. 21:741
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Meanwhile, in 1925, Evans completed an elaborate overhaul of his
small 1916 casebook. His second edition4 '-substantially an entirely
new work-rivaled Hall's casebook both in length and in sophistica-
tion. Its more than 1340 pages contained not only three times the
number of principal cases included in his first edition, but also a large
number of long and scholarly notes.
Evans's notes were a modest but significant pedagogical departure.
The annotations in Hall's casebook consisted of case summaries,
quotations, and citations, and did not include questions, critical
suggestions or comments designed to focus or guide analysis. Students
preparing for the classroom with Hall's casebook thus were left with no
guidance for their efforts in study and reflection, apart from the
editor's selection and arrangement of the cases themselves. Students
were left to organize their own "unnamed and tangled impressions,"
and to develop their "intuition of experience" through unguided"consideration of a multitude of instances and much and varied
reasoning and discussion, '"42 employing (as Thayer had earlier put it)
a great deal of "time, patience, and labor"43 which better guidance
might have helped them more efficiently use. Many of Evans's notes
were similar, but several included insightful comments providing some
substantive guidance." Perhaps in recognition of the Thayer-Hall
"figure it out for yourself' tradition, Evans observed in his preface that
his notes contained "some material which classes in law schools may
later casebook for West are discussed below.
41. EVANS, supra note 37.
42. HALL, supra note 30, at xi.
43. Thayer, supra note 24, at 177.
44. For example, in a note following Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495 (1922), and some
other cases, Evans observed:
The domestic commerce of each State which is confined entirely within its own
boundaries is not under Federal control, but inasmuch as Congress is authorized to
adopt whatever laws may be necessary and proper for carrying its powers into execution,
it may regulate the domestic commerce of the States in so far as such regulation is
necessary to the effective regulation of foreign or interstate commerce.
EVANS, supra note 37, at 787-88. And,
Since Congress may enact any legislation which is "necessary and proper for carrying
into execution" its war powers, it is vested in time of war with practically absolute
control over the man power and property of the country. ... It may authorize the
President to take over and operate the railways and to fix both interstate and intrastate
rates thereon. In such case the police power of the States becomes subordinate to the
paramount authority of the Federal Government.... For the protection of the health
and moral welfare of the army, it may authorize the Secretary of War to prevent the
establishment of disorderly houses within such distance of army camps as he may
prescribe ....
Id. at 566.
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find superfluous. ' 45  However, some of his comments illuminated
analytical points which could easily have been overlooked.
Evans's second edition was used in several law schools.46 After
Evans's death in 1928, Western Reserve Law Professor Archibald H.
Throckmorton prepared a third edition, published in 1933, which
incorporated intervening court decisions, rearranged topics, and
reorganized Evans's scholarly notes. Later editions with different
editors kept this casebook a staple of political science curricula until the
1960s; however, the law school market came to be dominated by
others.
Hall's 1913 casebook was republished in 1926, bound with a 400
page supplement containing cases decided during the intervening
thirteen years. Like the original, this "supplemented" edition eschewed
editorial commentary and critique. However, enough of the cases
between 1913 and 1929 seemed so controversial to Hall that for the
supplement he altered his format somewhat: observing that "the
pressure and interaction of conflicting interests in politics, society, and
business have been reflected in" the judiciary's recent constitutional
work, he said that "[s]ome of the questions discussed are so debatable
and perhaps subject to later reconsideration that liberal extracts have
been included from notable dissenting opinions."47 This was certain-
ly a step, though only a modest one, toward encouraging students to
interact more critically with authorities.
Eighteen months after Evans's second edition, in the same year
when Hall's supplemented edition appeared, a smaller casebook
alternative was published by University of Colorado law professor
Joseph Ragland Long. Long's shorter book used somewhat larger type
and still had just 950 pages, half the number of Hall's and two-thirds
the number of Evans's. Long's objective had been to make "a book of
moderate size" presenting "all the cases needed to afford material for
a course sufficiently comprehensive to meet the needs of the average
law school";48 and most of the 250 cases he included were very
heavily edited or merely excerpted. He explained that "[i]n editing the
45. EVANS, supra note 37, at v.
46. See LAWRENCE B. EVANS, LEADING CASES ON AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
(3d ed. 1933).
47. JAMES PARKER HALL, CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW iii (Supp. 1996). Among
the intervening cases for which Hall printed significant dissenting excerpts were Hammer v.
Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), United States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86 (1919), Bailey v. Drexel
Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20 (1922), Wilson v. New, 243 U.S. 332 (1917), and Block v. Hirsh, 256
U.S. 135 (1921).
48. JOSEPH RAGLAND LONG, CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW iii (1926).
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opinions all matter not pertinent to the point or points for which the
case was selected has been eliminated, and thus the cases have been
kept down to a reasonable length, and also, it is believed, they have
been made more readable."4
Long's severe editing, of course, eliminated a great deal of the
"much and varied reasoning and discussion" that Hall had deemed
indispensable to a soundly based legal intuition; it certainly obscured
the process of judicial evolution and adaptation, the "true nature of
their work," that Thayer had deemed important for students to
understand. Long did make space, however, for a number of notes
with citations to related cases, as well as a little instructive text at the
beginning of each of his chapters.
On a number of points Long included critical observations. In
contrast to Evans's comments, however, Long's, for the most part,
were not critical in any analytical sense, but were mere expressions of
opinion. For example, regarding Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.
he wrote, "The fact that the court was divided in opinion ... does not
at all indicate that the decision was wrong. . . . Notwithstanding much
adverse criticism of this decision, it now seems pretty clear that the
decision was correct."' "The decision in the case of United States v.
Doremus," he wrote, "is probably the most extreme extension of federal
power in the history of the Supreme Court, though closely approached
by the case of Caminetti v. United States.""1  He observed that the
E. C. Knight sugar trust case "has been severely criticized, though upon
the facts as alleged and proved it may be doubted whether adverse
criticism is justified." 2  Such comments, with no more elaboration
than Long provided, contribute nothing substantial to advancing a
student's understanding or critical skills.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 503.
51. Id. at 574.
52. Id. at 597.
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D. Dodd, Barrett, and the Modern Mode
Long's casebook was followed in 1932 by two others. One of
these was by Yale's Walter Fairleigh Dodd;13 the other was by
University of Minnesota Law School Professor Henry Rottschaefer."4
Between them, these soon displaced not only Long's but also both
Evans' and Hall's.
Rottschaefer's book was a title in the CCH University Casebook
Series. It ran about 1180 pages, some 300 fewer than Dodd's. The
two differed also in substance, not only in how they organized their
presentations of the subject, but also in the character of their editorial
notes. Rottschaefer's notes were extremely short, consisting of nothing
more than citations to additional cases and to law review articles.
Dodd's, on the other hand, were very extensive and included not only
citations but also substantial excerpts from opinions, and discussions
of points subsidiary or tangential to those the principal cases addressed.
More significant for the development of casebooks as teaching
tools, however, Dodd's notes (perhaps because of his more contentious
nature) included questions and suggestions that were posed deliberately
to induce comparison, analysis, extrapolation, and critical assessment
by the student. In a couple of dozen instances at least he prodded with
such questions or statements as "How is this case to be distinguished
from the Employer Liability cases?"; 5 or, "Did the opinion of Mr.
Justice McReynolds [for the Court] represent the view of a majority of
the court as to" a particular issue, where separate opinions also were
written; 6 or, "Distinguish this case from" another excerpted in a note
fifty pages prior; 7 or, "[t]o what extent is the above argument of Mr.
Justice Day supported by the distinction in" a principal case studied
in a previous chapter six hundred pages away; S8 or
Why is the court in this case primarily discussing issues under the
State Constitution? Is the discussion of freedom of speech to be
regarded as disposing of this issue under the Fourteenth Amend-
53. WALTER F. DODD, CASES AND OTHER AUTHORITIES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW,
SELECTED FROM DECISIONS OF STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS (1932).
54. HENRY ROTTSCHAEFER, CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1932).
55. DODD, supra note 53, at 613 n.12 (notes following Southern Ry. v. United States, 222
U.S. 611 (1911)).
56. Id. at 541 n.23 (notes following Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232 (1921)).
57. Id. at 633 n.15.
58. Id. at 965 n.12.
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ment? Compare the result in this case with the newspaper censor-
ship dealt with in Near v. Minnesota.. 11;
To what extent are compulsory minimum wage laws invalid in
their application to public employments and to minors? And if an
act as adopted applied to women and minors in all industries, can
it be considered as separable, so as to uphold it as to minors and as
to women in public employment?6"
and, "Query, whether the scope of the national war power extends to
the regulation of production of oil in time of peace, on the ground that
a sufficient supply of oil is necessary for naval purposes in time of
war. "61
Not even the few suggestive comments included in Evans's second
edition contained such pedagogical potential as these. These notes,
more effectively than anything in Thayer's volumes, tended to
"dephlegmatize" the student, actually engaging him in the intellectual
process of formulating and testing the propositions being promulgated
as constitutional law. The number of such suggestions and questions
in Dodd's first edition was small, but they pioneered an important
technique for casebook instruction toward competency in constitutional
law.
In 1939, West published Rottschaefer's Hornbook and the
Illustrative Cases to accompany it, and in 1948, West published
another full casebook by Rottschaefer. The latter was more than two
hundred pages shorter than the book Rottschaefer had done for the
CCH series seven years before, and less than three-fourths the size of
Dodd's. It did include notes, but insofar as these amounted to
anything more than those in his 1932 book, they were no more than
condensed adaptations of the declarative assertions in his Hornbook.
He offered nothing resembling Dodd's provocative questions and
suggestions.
When Rottschaefer's 1948 casebook was published, not only
Dodd's but also the newer casebook introduced by Columbia's Noel
Dowling in 193762 had already reached their third editions. Between
them, Dodd and Dowling kept a grip on the market that Rottschaefer's
book was inadequate to break. Along with one by Georgetown Law
59. Id. at 881 n.14 (notes following Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 236 U.S. 230
(1915)).
60. Id. at 933 n.6 (notes following Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923)).
61. Id. at 529 n.21 (in a note appended to Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse
Co., 251 U.S. 146 (1919) but discussing the spate of cases spawned by the first World War
upholding far-reaching federal laws, including some under the Necessary and Proper Clause).
62. NOEL T. DOWLING, CASES ON AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1937).
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Professor Robert A. Maurer, published in 1941,63 it soon was left by
the way.64 Even the 1950 casebook by Professor John P. Frank of
Yale gained too small a following to endure.6"
Dowling's thrived, however, alongside of Dodd's, through several
editions. In fact, while Dodd's waned after six editions, Dowling's
continued to run strong into the 1960s when Gerald Gunther took it
up and began its regeneration.
Meanwhile, the year 1954 saw not only new editions by both
Dowling and Dodd, but also new entries from Michigan and Har-
vard-all of them taking market share from the six-year-old Rott-
schaefer and the four-year-old, idiosyncratic Frank. The Michigan
entry was Professor Paul Kauper s,66 a book somewhat smaller than
Dowling's and almost four hundred pages smaller than Dodd's. Its
notes were encyclopedic, but merely declarative. The Harvard book-a
joint enterprise of Professors Paul Freund, Arthur Sutherland, Mark
DeWolfe Howe, and Ernest Brown-was a two-volume, 1,750-page
contender with Thayer's for designation as the casebook most
unmanageably oversized for instructional use.67 Its extensive notes
did, however, make some occasional use of questions to help focus
student attention and analysis.
Two other constitutional law casebooks appeared five years later,
in 1959. One was the severely edited (873 pages) and too superficial
book by Dean Ray Forrester of Tulane, which never saw a second
edition.6" The other was a 1,200-page product of some years of
63. ROBERT ADAM MAURER, CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1941). Maurer did
without questions and-except for short background narratives introducing certain chap-
ters-without commentary of any kind.
64. HENRY ROTTSCHAEFER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1948).
However, Rottschaefer's 1948 book still clung to at least one outpost well over a decade later:
when I began law school at Kansas in 1961, dilapidated recirculated copies were the prescribed
fare for the constitutional law course taught (poorly) by James Barclay Smith.
65. JOHN P. FRANK, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1950). Frank
made substantial and valuable use of questions and suggestions to aid and direct student analysis.
However, instead of using a topical or systematic structure, he organized the book by historical
periods-"The Marshall Era," "The Taney Era," "White and Taft," etc. followed by chapters
on "The Constitution Today" and "Contemporary Problems." A somewhat similar organization
has been utilized by the modern casebook of Paul Brest since Sanford Levinson joined as coeditor
for the second edition in 1983.
Frank published a revised edition in 1952, which he credited to "the extraordinary rapidity
of development in constitutional law in the recent past," and to "the helpful suggestions made by
reviewers and informal critics on the first edition."
66. PAUL G. KAUPER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS (1954).
67. PAUL A. FREUND ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND OTHER PROBLEMS
(1954).
68. RAY FORRESTER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS (1959).
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evolution in mimeographed form, coedited by Professor Edward L.
Barrett, Jr., then of Berkeley, and his Pennsylvania colleagues Paul W.
Bruton and John Honnold.69 Over the next eighteen years Honnold
and then Bruton dropped off; for the major revision constituting the
sixth edition in 1981, Barrett enlisted Stanford's William Cohen.
Jonathan D. Varat of UCLA joined the team for the eighth edition in
1989. With the ninth edition in 1993, it became the Cohen and Varat
casebook, now in its tenth edition.
The 1959 Barrett casebook refined and employed far more
extensively the technique that Dodd had modestly pioneered. While
Dowling (whose sixth edition appeared just as the Barrett book
debuted) used questions in his notes as a rhetorical device to introduce
authorities on tangential topics,70 the predominant use of questions in
Barrett's notes was different. The editors' preface explained:
Intensive examination of constitutional problems has been our
primary goal.... Notes following71 the cases are designed to carry
the student farther into the examination of the problem before him
rather than to divert him to minor questions or serve as a collection
of authorities. To the same end we frequently set forth statements
of facts in the form of problems. These problems are designed for
consideration on the basis of the materials which precede them and
thus can serve to toughen the students' minds through exercise in
applying constitutional principles to situations which are more
realistic and difficult than can be posed in the classroom; these
problems at the same time test the workability of the ideas devel-
oped by the cases.72
When Gerald Gunther73 updated and revised Dowling's classic
for its seventh edition in 1965, he began moving it in the same
pedagogical direction as Barrett and Dodd had taken. He worked at
"the recasting and expansion of textual notes to provide background,
69. EDWARD L. BARRETT, JR. ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS
(1959).
70. For example the question, "To what extent is it a judicial question as to whether a
taking is for a public purpose?" began a note consisting of excerpts from several cases discussing
the requisite deference. DOWLING, supra note 62, at 812 n.2.
71. In addition, "In various places where relevant background (historical, economic or social)
is not exposed in the opinions of the Court we have prepared introductory notes." BARRETT, J.
ET AL., supra note 69, at ix.
72. Id. at ix.
73. Gunther initially enjoyed the collaboration of his erstwhile Columbia colleague, Herbert
Wechsler. See NOEL T. DOWLING & GERALD GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW preface (7th ed. 1965).
19981
Seattle University Law Review
sharpen focus, and promote analysis ... in depth."74  In succeeding
editions, as the book evolved from Dowling's into Gunther's own, this
characteristic was enhanced.
Meanwhile, Minnesota's Professors Lockhart, Kamisar, and
Choper produced their landmark in 1964."s This 1,400-page book
quickly became a market leader during a period of substantial growth
in the law student population. "LocKamChop" made even more
extensive use of questions in its notes than the Barrett casebook had.
Many of those questions were very apt to start students in useful
directions of criticism and analysis.
It is possible, however, for overuse to spoil a good thing. The
number of question marks in the Lockhart book's extensive notes
seemed almost to exceed all other punctuation marks combined.
Teaching from it at Colorado in the 1960s, I found many students
frustrated and confused rather than excited by these concatenated
interrogatories. For many of the questions, students were given too
little background for them to be able to cope except in terms of
preconceptions and predilections. Sometimes an impossibly large
question was put, or a faulty dichotomy posed, where instead a stepped
succession of questions or suggestions was needed for analytical
guidance.76 In my experience, many students ignored important
questions that, with better calculation, might have helped them to
organize and understand complicated issues,77 and thought themselves
sufficiently prepared by considering others that they could dispose of
with common sense7" or political opinion.
74. Id. at xi.
75. WILLIAM B. LOCKHART ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES - COMMENTS -
QUESTIONS (1964).
76. For example, following the utterly ungrounded opinion in United States v. Sullivan, 332
U.S. 689 (1948), there was this doubly opaque false lead: "Which is the clearer case for Federal
Power-control over misbranding in the Sullivan situation or making it a federal crime to commit
a state criminal offense after interstate travel for the purpose of committing the crime?"
LOCKHART ET. AL., supra note 75, at 261 n.2(b).
77. For example, following Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495 (1922), which alluded to
Justice Holmes's "stream of commerce" metaphor: "Is the theory here that the activities in the
stockyards actually constitute interstate commerce, or that they are subject to regulation because
of their harmful impact on interstate commerce? Might it make any difference which theory is
adopted?" LOCKHART ET AL., supra note 75, at 197 n.1.
Similarly, following Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937): "[W]as Butler a
dependable precedent after Steward?" LOCKHART ET AL. supra note 75, at 239 n.l(c).
78. For example, following Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962): "Do you agree that'pressures to conform' are difficult to measure? More difficult than many other constitutional
determinations? If so, should this bar their consideration?" LOCKHART, ET AL., supra note 75,
at 1176.
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Nonetheless, overall the Lockhart casebook was very good and its
successive editions have been highly successful. Moreover, the
technique of interrogatory rather than merely declaratory notes and
comments-pioneered by Dodd and refined by Barrett, even if
overdone by Lockhart a bit-has now been standard in constitutional
law casebooks for a generation.
When artfully used, this technique of guiding critical thought with
carefully crafted questions is very effective for inculcating in students
a sense of vitality and possibility in constitutional law. It promotes a
critical orientation toward accustomed doctrine, an inclination to
question authority while respecting experience, and a sense that it
makes a critical difference what questions are asked (or overlooked),
and how a proposition is put. For lawyers who are to deal with issues
of governance and freedom in a modern society with aspirations for
democracy and liberty as well as order, these are essential requisites of
professional competency.
III. FEDERALISM: THE CASEBOOKS' UNMET CHALLENGE
A. The Opportunity at Hand
The technique of the modern casebooks, however, has not been
utilized with equal diligence and sophistication in all branches of
constitutional law. Questions of federalism in particular do not receive
the attention and critical imagination necessary to guide students
toward competency. Certain recent cases79 have obliged casebook
editors to give some of these issues somewhat more notice, and have
elicited a skeptical question or two and some querulous observations.
Yet, there still is lacking the attention needed to help students
comprehend, clarify, or refine the concepts being asserted (or rediscov-
ered) and applied. The casebooks still treat the notion of intrinsic legal
limits to the national government's legislative power (particularly the
"commerce power") as ill-founded, outdated, unsophisticated, and dull.
There is room here for specific discussion of only one category of
federalism issues the casebooks leave unexplored. It is one, however,
with extraordinary significance: the meaning and misconceptions of
the Necessary and Proper Clause. More than ten years ago Justice
O'Connor, for herself and Justices Rehnquist and Powell, observed
that NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,"8 United States v.
79. E.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); New York v. United States, 505 U.S.
144 (1992).
80. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
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Darby,8  Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,82 and the
other modern cases regarded as expanding Congress's "commerce
power," really rest not on the Constitution's Commerce Clause itself,
but on the Necessary and Proper Clause. As O'Connor observed,
The Court based the expansion on the authority of Congress,
through the Necessary and Proper Clause, "to resort to all means for
the exercise of a granted power which are appropriate and plainly
adapted to the permitted end." ... It is through this reasoning that
an intrastate activity "affecting" interstate commerce can be reached
through the commerce power.83
Justice Thomas noted the same thing in 1995.4
This recognition that the so-called "affectation" doctrine turns not
on the Commerce Clause itself, but on the Necessary and Proper
Clause, opens avenues of analysis and argument that have not been
traveled for fifty years. It makes comprehensible the contrast between
the classic view of federal legislative power recovered in the later
1930s, and the virtual abrogation of enumerated powers doctrine
indulged from the mid-1940s until recently. However, the point is
totally lost upon the editors of constitutional law casebooks. Students
still are not prompted to explore the differences and connections
between these two clauses, or even to perceive them.
These connections and differences become obvious when certain
doctrines and developments that are generally familiar are given a
closer look. The first of these to be examined is the notion of "dual
federalism," which had been scrambling Commerce Clause with
Necessary and Proper Clause issues for some decades before the New
Deal.
81. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
82. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
83. Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 580, 584-85
(1985) (O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Powell, J., dissenting). The excerpt in
quotation marks is from the Court's opinion in United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. at 124.
O'Connor's observation might have been prompted by a manuscript I had sent to her (and
to Justices Rehnquist, Powell, and Blackmun) some weeks after the March 1994, argument of
Garcia, and before it was set for reargument the next term. After the reargument order, I sent
the manuscript in August to all Justices as well as to all counsel in the Garcia case. It later was
published as Sense and Nonsense About State Immunity, 2 CONST. COMM. 93 (1985), and was
cited on a different point in the O'Connor-Rehnquist-Powell dissent, 469 U.S. at 587. (This
correspondence is on file with the Seattle University Law Review.).
84. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 588 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
The Necessary and Proper Clause has recently begun receiving serious attention from some
young constitutional scholars. See, e.g., Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The 'Proper' Scope
of Federal Power: A Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267 (1993);
Stephen Gardbaum, Rethinking Constitutional Federalism, 74 TEXAS L. REV. 795 (1996).
[Vol. 21:741
Constitutional Competency
B. The Dual Federalism Error
Dual federalism was a melange of intellectual mistakes consolidat-
ed in the course of judicial efforts to constrain federal power as
Congress grew more active during and after the Progressive era.
Rooted in the same Jeffersonian misconceptions that spawned
nullification and ultimately secession,8" dual federalism envisioned the
state and the nation as assigned discrete (and essentially exclusive)86
subject-matter realms of competence. It thus conceived of the states'"reserved powers" as delimiting what Congress could do.
At the time when dual federalism was becoming dominant, no
casebook induced prospective lawyers to critically examine its premises,
or to compare it to Hamilton's and Marshall's classic analysis of
federalism, which it had displaced. Thayer's casebook had been
published in 1895, when even the Sherman Act was still very new;
United States v. E.C. Knight Co.87 had not even been published in the
official reports when Thayer included it in his casebook. Virtually no
other laws as to which distinctions between the Commerce and
Necessary and Proper Clauses would matter had yet been enacted.
Eighteen years later there were some such laws, but Dean Hall, in his
1913 casebook, actually endorsed the dual federalist vision, saying in
his preface, "Our dual federal system compels a delimitation of the
spheres of state and nation throughout an ever-shifting 'twilight
zone.' "88
85. Thomas Jefferson came home from Paris in 1789 to serve under a Constitution which
(unlike its "Bill of Rights" Amendments) he had not participated in making and never really quite
understood. His misconception of the nation as a confederation or compact of sovereignties, and
of its government as an establishment of the several States as such (instead of their several peoples
acting in common), died very hard-and, indeed, its ghost occasionally returns to haunt jurispru-
dence even today. Hamilton's understanding of the Constitution was far more acute. Even
Madison, at first, seems to have inclined Hamilton's way-until his bright but impressionable
mind reverted to Jefferson's dominium after the older of these close Virginia friends returned from
abroad.
86. The presumption of mutual exclusivity underlay, for example, the dual -federalists'
objection that to let Congress exclude goods from interstate shipment because of the circumstances
of their manufacture would enable Congress to control manufacturing "to the practical exclusion
of the authority of the States." Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 272 (1918). It also explains
the dual federalists' inability to comprehend Hamilton's understanding of the "spending power."
See David E. Engdahl, The Spending Power, 44 DUKE L.J. 1 (1994). The dual federalists
mistakenly thought that if the federal will could "reach the subject matter"-by conditioning
funds-"its exertion cannot be displaced by state action." United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1,
74 (1936).
87. 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
88. HALL, supra note 30, at xi.
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To help mark the boundary between the state and federal
domains, dual-federalists employed a verbal distinction-"direct"
versus "indirect"-earlier used in reviewing the interstate impacts of
state laws when Congress's own power over interstate commerce lay
idle. Johns Hopkins Professor W.W. Willoughby, for example, opined
that the second federal Employers' Liability Act, enacted in 1908,9
was unconstitutional because employer liability for employee injuries
was not "so directly related to interstate commerce as to bring this
liability within the determining power of Congress."9 In contrast, he
said the interstate commerce impact of the 1907 Railroad Hours of
Service Act "would, however, seem to be somewhat more direct."91
In the Dormant Commerce Clause context, the task of distin-
guishing "direct" from "indirect" effects was of course a judicial one,
for when its own power remained "dormant," Congress ordinarily had
made no judgment at all regarding affected state laws. Unfortunately,
when this dichotomy was employed when Congress had taken action,
Justices too easily assumed that in this context, too, the distinction
between direct and indirect was for them to judge.92 Consequently,
they invalidated federal laws regulating local activities as means toward
interstate commerce ends when in the Justices' own judgment the
connection to interstate commerce was too indirect.93 Undue rigor
with an adjective thus induced the dual-federalists to overlook the
classic Necessary and Proper Clause principle of broad deference to
Congress's judgment as to whether and what rules for extraneous
matters might help "carry[] into Execution" its will for things
acknowledged to lie within the scope of some enumerated power.94
This failure to employ classic Necessary and Proper Clause
analysis when it truly was called for was only one of dual federalism's
mistakes. A second was its misuse of that clause's telic (means-to-end)
paradigm to curtail the other enumerated powers, most notably the
plenary Commerce Clause power. For example, in 1918 the majority
in Hammer v. Dagenhart wrote, "The grant of power to Congress over
89. The first Employers' Liability Act, enacted in 1906, had been held unconstitutional in
Howard v. Illinois Central Ry. Co., 207 U.S. 463 (1908).
90. WESTEL WOODBURY WILLOUGHBY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES 743 (1910).
91. Id. at 745.
92. This was the same era during which the Justices took it upon themselves to displace
legislative judgments regarding economic policy under the guise of "substantive due process."
93. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (invalidating portions of the
Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935). See also Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,
295 U.S. 495 (1935); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
94. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. (17 U.S.) 316 (1819).
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the subject of interstate commerce was to enable it to regulate such
commerce, and not to give it authority to control the States in their
exercise of the police power over local trade and manufacture.""
Dagenhart is the classic example of thus treating the telic (means-to-
enumerated-end) requisite of the Necessary and Proper Clause not
simply as the essence of one power, but as a restriction of the other
enumerated powers-of erroneously taking that clause's endorsement
of extraneous means as a prohibition against extraneous ends96--of
misapplying the Necessary and Proper Clause to curtail Congress's
choice of how it might use its plenary powers as means. 97
Even before Dagenhart, however, confusion between the plenary
Commerce Clause power and the end-dependent Necessary and Proper
Clause power prevailed in judicial thinking. This confusion had
predominated, for example, in the Lottery Case98 in 1903, where the
95. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 273-74 (1918). The Dagenhart majority thus
excoriated the act forbidding interstate shipment of child-made goods as "exert[ing] a power as
to a purely local matter to which the federal authority does not extend." Id. at 276.
96. Thus, for example, presaging the majority in Dagenhart, the dissenters in the Lottery
Case (Champion v. Ames) had denounced the proposition that by means of its enumerated powers
Congress "may accomplish objects not entrusted to the General Government," because they
believed that would "defeat the operation of the Tenth Amendment." 188 U.S. 321, 365 (1908)
(dissenting opinion).
97. Dagenhart also is notable for the dual federalists' "all-costs" assertion that
[t]his court has no more important function than that which devolves upon it the
obligation to preserve inviolate the constitutional limitations upon the exercise of
authority federal and state to the end that each may continue to discharge, harmoniously
with the other, the duties entrusted to it by the Constitution.
247 U.S. at 276 (And to the end that neither may ever enter the other's separate, exclusive
sphere!).
Dual federalism used state sovereignty even to curtail the Necessary and Proper Clause itself.
For example, in one 1926 case during prohibition involving the enforcement clause of the
Eighteenth Amendment (analogous to the Necessary and Proper Clause), Justice Sutherland
quoted Madison's espousal of Jefferson's discredited anti-Hamiltonian view of the latter and
denounced the federal law that forbade physicians to prescribe liquor as a regulation of medical
practice-a matter which, in dual federalism terms, is reserved exclusively to the States. The law,
Sutherland reasoned, even though passed to enforce the amendment's prohibition, was therefore
"in fraud of [the Constitution], and especially of the Tenth Amendment." Lambert v. Yellowley,
272 U.S. 581, 597, 604 (1926) (dissenting opinion). "A grant of power to prohibit for specified
purposes," Sutherland reasoned, "does not include the power to prohibit for other and different
purposes." Id. at 603.
98. Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
As the dissenters in Champion pointed out,
Congress may indeed make all laws necessary and proper for carrying the powers
granted to it into execution, and doubtless an act prohibiting the carriage of lottery
matter would be necessary and proper to the execution of a power to suppress lotteries;
but that power belongs to the States and not to Congress.
188 U.S. at 365 (dissenting opinion).
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majority mistakenly thought it necessary to opine that the law against
shipping lottery tickets interstate seemed "a fit or appropriate mode for
the regulation of that particular kind of commerce," "appropriate and
necessary to protect the country at large against a species of interstate
commerce which .. .has grown into disrepute." 99
1. Harlan Fiske Stone and Dual Federalism's Demise
Dual federalism's hold on some of its erstwhile adherents had
slipped enough by 1937 that a bare majority of Justices coalesced to
validate the National Labor Relations Act (or rather, a narrowed
misconstruction of it) in the Jones & Laughlin case.1"' Chief Justice
Hughes pointed out that Justice Holmes's misleading "current of
commerce" metaphor"' pertains not to the scope of interstate
commerce itself, but to the same "means-to-commerce-clause-end"
principle earlier used to justify federal laws on employer liability and
the practices of stockyards dealers and commission-men;0 2 but
Hughes was not exact in tracing that principle to its source. Had all
of the Jones & Laughlin majority at that time attributed it to the
Necessary and Proper Clause, given how that clause had already been
held to operate in conjunction with other enumerated powers,103 they
Deprecating the majority's rationale in the Lottery Case as "scarcely distinguishable from
what has been denominated the Wilson-Roosevelt doctrine of constitutional construction,"
Professor Willoughby denounced the child labor bill it inspired as "rather a regulation of the
manner in which certain goods are manufactured or produced, than of their transportation across
state lines," and as "an attempt upon the part of the Federal Government to regulate a matter
reserved to the control of the States." WILLOUGHBY, supra note 90, at 738, 739, 740 (1910).
Willoughby thus presaged the dual-federalism argument that was to prevail against the Child
Labor Act in Hammer v. Dagenhart.
99. 188 U.S. at 326, 328.
Similarly, in Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913) (sustaining the "White Slave Act"
which prohibited transporting women for sex), after characterizing Congress's power over
interstate transportation as "complete it itself," the Court went bumbling on about "means" that
are "incident," "not only means necessary but convenient to its exercise." Id. at 323.
At the same time, however, the Court did sometimes recognize the Necessary and Proper
Clause's proper role as authority for particular regulations of local matters when the particular
regulation was aimed to effectuate Congress's will for interstate commerce itself. See, e.g.,
McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 115 (1913) (upholding provision against removal of prescribed
label even after interstate commerce had ended, to facilitate inspection for the purpose of ensuring
that prescribed label had been present during interstate commerce, as required).
100. National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
101. Swift v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 399 (1905).
102. See Mondou v. RR. Co., 223 U.S. 1(1912); Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495 (1922).
103. See, e.g., Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 457 (1871) (wartime legal tender clause in
Treasury Notes, to help effectuate power to maintain armies and navy); McCulloch v. Maryland,
4 Wheat. (17 U.S.) 316 (1819) (bank incorporated to facilitate exercise of borrowing and certain
other powers); United States v. Fisher, 2 Cr. (5 U.S.) 358 (1804) (statutory preferred status of
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might not have thought it necessary to disregard the preamble and
legislative history °4 of the NLRA and to radically refashion the
Act' in order to sustain it.
Modern casebooks play Jones & Laughlin for dramatic effect
rather than pointing out its limited and transitional character. The
typical overemphasis on court-packing politics and the dramatic
changes in Supreme Court membership between 1937 and 1941,
however, obscures the intellectual developments involved. Of the eight
Justices who unanimously decided United States v. Darby in 1941,106
Justices Roberts, Hughes and Stone had each been on the Court for a
decade or more. By 1941, these three had grown to understand things
better than they evidently did even in 1937-and far better than some
of the new appointees ever would.
Stone, who wrote the Darby opinion, was a former Columbia law
professor and dean with a tax and patent lawyer's disposition for detail;
and by 1941 he could plainly see the old cases on intrastate rail
rates,0 7 train safety appliances,0 8 hours of service for carriers'
noninterstate employees, 10 9 stockyards practices, "' and monopolies
even of manufacturing where the forbidden impact on interstate
commerce was shown,"' as cases illustrating Congress's power under
United States as creditor of its revenue collectors, to help effectuate collection of taxes).
104. If it were given the scope suggested by its preamble and history and the sweep of its
provisions, the Court said,
the Act would necessarily fall by reason of the limitation upon the federal power which
inheres in the constitutional grant [i.e., the Commerce Clause], as well as because of the
explicit reservation of the Tenth Amendment. Schechter Corp. v. United States, 295
U.S. 495, 549, 550, 554. The authority of the federal government may not be pushed
to such an extreme as to destroy the distinction, which the commerce clause itself
establishes, between commerce "among the several States" and the internal concerns of
a State. That distinction between what is national and what is local in the activities of
commerce is vital to the maintenance of our federal system.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. at 30.
105. The Court observed that "as between two possible interpretations of a statute, by one
of which it would be unconstitutional and by the other valid, our plain duty is to adopt that which
will save the act." It then declared, "We think it clear that the National Labor Relations Act may
be construed so as to operate within the sphere of constitutional authority." Id. Accordingly the
Court disregarded Congress's own explicit findings, construed the Act as requiring that the
NLRB find the requisite interstate commerce impact case by case, and determined that the NLRB
findings were supported by the facts presented. Id.
106. Justice McReynolds retired the day before the decision in Darby was announced.
107. E.g., Railroad Comm'n of Wisconsin v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy RR. Co., 257
U.S. 563 (1922); Houston, East & West Texas Ry. Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914).
108. E.g., Southern Railway Co. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20 (1911).
109. Wilson v. New, 243 U.S. 332 (1917).
110. Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495 (1922); Swift and Company v. United States, 196
U.S. 375 (1905).
111. E.g., Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
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the Necessary and Proper Clause, not its power under the Commerce
Clause itself. Indeed, some of the opinions in those older cases had
even used phrases derived from McCulloch, or the very words of the
Necessary and Proper Clause." 2  It was not quite inaccurate to
describe them as "commerce power" cases (or even as "Commerce
Clause" cases), because Congress's power under the Necessary and
Proper Clause is always (because inherently) adjunct to some other
enumerated power. In like manner, a law giving the United States
priority among an insolvent's creditors might be called an exercise of
Congress's power to tax--even though the displacement of state
creditor-rights laws in order to carry into execution Congress's
enumerated power to collect taxes depends technically on the Necessary
and Proper Clause. However, while this more casual manner of
speaking is not quite inaccurate, it is not precise, and Stone had come
to appreciate the importance of greater precision in this regard.
To call such precedents Commerce Clause cases (or to call United
States v. Doremus, for example, a taxing-power case) is to employ a
kind of shorthand.113 Stone himself continued using this short-
hand,.1 . but it no longer prevented his seeing-and pointing
out-when the Necessary and Proper Clause rather than the Commerce
Clause was really at work.
Stone marked the distinction clearly in Darby. The shipping
prohibition was upheld under the Commerce Clause itself: Hammer
v. Dagenhart, with its dual-federalist curtailment of Congress's power
over interstate commerce, was overruled and the plenary character"'
of that power-recognized early in Gibbons v. Ogden and later in
Holmes's Dagenhart dissent-was restored. At the same time,
Congress's telic power" 6 (not plenary) over intrastate activities for
112. For example, Congress has power to foster and protect interstate commerce "and to
take all measures necessary or appropriate to that end, although intrastate transactions ... may
thereby be controlled." Houston, East & West Texas Ry. Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342,
353 (1914).
113. 249 U.S. 86 (1919) (upholding registration and records-keeping requirements of the
Harrison Narcotic Drug Act).
114. For example, in Darby itself Justice Stone posed the constitutional question as to
Sections 15(a)(2) and 6 and 7 as "whether such restriction on the production of goods for
commerce is a permissible exercise of the commerce power." 312 U.S. at 118 (emphasis added).
115. Because it is plenary, Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce can be exerted
regardless of the end (if any) that is served. Congress can regulate interstate commerce for
commercial ends, or for consumer protection ends, or for health or safety ends, or for any other
ends whatsoever. It also may impede or destroy interstate commerce should it so choose. Being
plenary, the only limits on the commerce power itself (aside from the Bill of Rights) are political.
116. The power granted by the Necessary and Proper Clause depend totally on the
constitutional validity of the end being served. It gives no power except to enact laws with the
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interstate commerce ends-by virtue of which the production wage and
hour requirements were sustained-was premised explicitly on
McCulloch v. Maryland,117 which is not a Commerce Clause case at
all but the quintessential elucidation of the Necessary and Proper
Clause.
The next year, a few months after his appointment as Chief
Justice, Stone wrote in United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co.118 that
even though the dairy's business "is entirely intrastate," the power of
Congress
is not confined in its exercise to the regulation of commerce among
the states. It extends to those activities intrastate which so affect
interstate commerce, or the exertion of the power of Congress over
it, as to make regulation of them appropriate means to the attain-
ment of a legitimate end, the effective execution of the granted
power to regulate interstate commerce. See McCulloch v. Maryland,
... ; United States v. Darby .... 119
Stone noted that Congress has plenary power over interstate commerce
(a proposition for which he cited Gibbons v. Ogden); but when he
upheld Congress's regulation of that local dairy's "entirely intrastate"
dealings he said, "[i]t is the effect upon interstate commerce or upon
the exercise of the power to regulate it, not the source of the injury,
which is the criterion of Congressional power. '"120 The particular
congressional power he was referring to was not any power conferred
by the Commerce Clause itself, but rather the power illustrated by
McCulloch v. Maryland: the power conferred by the Necessary and
Proper Clause. He had the same crucial distinction in mind when, a
few weeks later, he joined in deciding Wickard v. Filburn,121 where
the Government defended the regulation regarding crops for home
consumption as "necessary and proper" to effectuate Congress's will
for interstate commerce.1 22
Therefore, half a decade after Jones & Laughlin, Chief Justice
Stone had a firm grasp of the distinction Justice O'Connor would
rediscover four decades later. Had there not intervened an hegemony
of less patient minds driven by wills even more forceful than Stone's,
requisite telic (means-to-end) relation to matters within the scope of some enumerated power.
117. See Darby, 312 U.S. at 118-19.
118. 315 U.S. 110 (1942)
119. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. at 119.
120. Id. at 526-27.
121. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
122. See Filburn, 317 U.S. at 119.
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we might already have seen in the caselaw the refinements of analysis
and expression that attention to this distinction must entail.
The first refinement probably would have been to emphasize the
particularistic character of Congress's power over "activities affecting"
interstate commerce. The word "activity" is inherently vague, and is
commonly used with a wide range of generality. There is a difference,
however, between the "activity" of data entry and the "activity" of
banking, for example, of which data entry is a small though important
part. Raising a family is an "activity" consisting of thousands of
"activities," from changing diapers and washing clothes to nurturing
adolescents and financing college. Each of these more specific
"activities" could be detailed with greater specificity still. Even Justice
O'Connor observed (as most constitutional law teachers have) that in
today's "integrated national economy," "virtually every state activity,
like virtually every activity of a private individual, arguably 'affects'
interstate commerce," '123 but the credibility of that observation
depends (at least) on the generality level at which "activity" is
conceived. It might seem credible to say that raising a family "affects
interstate commerce," but it is more of a stretch to say that changing
a diaper does so (although, of course, one determined to mock the
Constitution could probably argue that, too).124
When Justice Stone in the Darby case wrote that Congress's power
'extends to ... activities intrastate which ... affect interstate
commerce," the activity he was considering was not the highly
generalized activity of manufacturing, or even of operating the Darby
Lumber Company; it was the far more specific activity of "the
employment, under other than the prescribed labor standards, of
employees engaged in the production of goods for interstate com-
merce."' 125  That more particular "activity" is what the Fair Labor
Standards Act reached. In fact, to be even more precise, it was the
particular rule prescribed for that more particular activity that the
Court found would "affect interstate commerce or the exercise of the
power of Congress over it" in such a way as to conduce "to the
123. Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, at 584
(dissenting opinion).
124. See, for example, the extravagant construct of imagination posited by Justice Breyer,
dissenting in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 618-25 (1995)-which Congress shortly
afterwards reiterated, see Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, P.L. 103-322,
§ 320904, 108 Stat. 1796 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1994)).
125. Darby, 312 U.S. at 117.
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attainment of a legitimate end, the exercise of the granted power of
Congress to regulate interstate commerce. "126
Similarly, the issue in the Wrightwood Dairy case did not concern
the overall business activity of the dairy company, or others of the
thousands of more particular activities it performed. The one specific,
particular activity regulated by the law there at issue was setting a price
to be paid milk producers; and it was because that particular activi-
ty-or rather, performing it as Congress prescribed-was found to
affect what Congress desired for interstate commerce, that the
regulation was held valid even though neither that activity itself, nor
any other activity of the Wrightwood Dairy Company, was deemed to
be interstate commerce.1 27
This particularity feature is patent on the face of the Necessary
and Proper Clause: it confers only power to make "Laws . .. for
carrying into Execution" any enumerated power (emphasis added).
Where this telic requisite is satisfied, it just does not matter to what
or to whom a given provision of law might apply. However, no
interstate commerce effect of an activity (at whatever level of particu-
larity conceived) can justify under this clause the application to that
activity (or to any more generalized activity of which it is part) of any
particular provision of law that fails to pass muster as a means "for
carrying into Execution" Congress's will for interstate commerce (or
some other enumerated power).
Nonetheless, this point, which is so obvious on the face of the
Necessary and Proper Clause, is easily overlooked when one misat-
tributes the "affecting commerce" doctrine to construction of the
Commerce Clause itself. Congress's power under the Commerce
Clause, after all, is plenary. Therefore, if one supposes that the
Commerce Clause itself embraces "activities affecting" interstate
commerce, it seems counterintuitive to doubt that Congress's power
over any such "affecting activity" is plenary, too. Indeed, that plenary
character follows afortiori; and a power that is plenary is, by defini-
tion, not limited to enacting "Laws . . . for carrying into Execution"
Congress's will for interstate commerce (or some other enumerated
concern).
The vagueness of the term "activity" itself compounds this
potential for totally misconceiving the holdings in Jones & Laughlin,
Darby, Wrightwood Dairy, and even Wickard. It is easy to misunder-
126. Id. at 118.
127. And, one might add, even if nothing else ever done by the dairy company had any
impact on interstate commerce at all.
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stand so completely as to suppose that Congress may prohibit digging
a pit near a church with no more charade of constitutional rationale
than that the pit is dug by a strip mining company and strip mining
is an "activity" (at a high level of generality) that "affects interstate
commerce" in various ways. To one so out of touch with constitution-
al premises-as most of the Justices apparently were by the time they
considered the Surface Mining Act 12-the question of what effect
the particular rule against churchside digging, for example,129 might
have in promoting Congress's will for interstate commerce, would
never even occur. 130
Other refinements would surely have emerged in succeeding cases.
There would have been occasion to consider how "substantial" the telic
connection must be, and whether any of the other adjectives employed
in the course of applying the Necessary and Proper Clause over a
century and a half 31 might help illuminate the quality and degree of
means-to-end connection that should be required. Differences
probably would have been noticed in the latitude allowed for judicial
assessment of telic connections when Congress left the issue for case-
by-case proof (as under the Sherman Act),132 when Congress instead
delegated the determination to an administrative agency (as in the
NLRA as construed in Jones & Laughlin),133 and when Congress
itself ascertained the means-to-end connection. In the latter circum-
128. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Association, 452 U.S. 264
(1981).
129. Or even the Act's "prime farmland" provisions, as to which the District Court in
Indiana had reasoned more carefully than the Justices themselves deemed appropriate.
130. While the Surface Mining Act was pending in Congress, I suggested to the legal
counsel of the Senate Interior Committee the importance of demonstrating, not merely the effects
of strip mining upon interstate commerce, but the particularized telic connection between each
regulation imposed and some policy of Congress for interstate commerce. His response, however,
was both disappointing and instructive: he said, "Huh? Whaddayamean?"
131. For example, "obvious relation to," "natural relation to," and "fairly applicable to,"
all phrases used by Hamilton in his 1791 Opinion on the United States Bank, 8 THE PAPERS OF
ALEXANDER HAMILTON 97, 102 (Syrett ed. 1965); "in fact conducive to," a phrase used by
Chief'Justice Marshall in United States v. Fisher, 2 Cr. (5 U.S.) 358 (1804); "plainly adapted to,""appropriate," "really calculated to," phrases used by Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v.
Maryland, 4 Wheat. (17 U.S.) 316 (1819); "reasonably adapted to," a phrase used in Heart of
Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
132. The Sherman Act prohibited only such combinations (even among manufacturers) as
were "in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states." Consequently, when the
requisite proof of such purpose or effect was made, manufacturers could be convicted, as for
example in Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 75 U.S. 211 (1899). When the requisite
proof was not made--even if that failure was deliberate because Attorney General Richard Olney
wanted to curtail the Sherman Act (after he had failed to secure its repeal)--the manufacturers
unsurprisingly went free, as for example in United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
133. See notes 103-04 supra and accompanying text.
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stance it surely would have been realized that the deference and
priority due congressional judgments on the issue of
"means"--deference accorded and priority recognized since even before
McCulloch v. Maryland'134-not only precludes judicial displacement
of such telic judgments unless they lack any ground in reason, 13 but
also precludes judicial speculation positing conceivable telic judgments
that Congress has not manifestly made. 136  There might even have
been some early occasion to ponder Hamilton's suggestion that the
134. See, e.g., United States v. Fisher, 2 Cr. (5 U.S.) 358 (1804) (holding bankruptcy
priority taken by United States pursuant to Act of March 3rd, 1797 was a proper exercise of
Congressional power under necessary and proper clause).
135. This is the familiar "rational basis" rule of such cases as Katzenbach v. McClung, 379
U.S. 294 (1964).
What is required under this "rational basis" test-in contrast to the different "rational basis"
test employed, e.g., in the substantive due process and equal protection cases-is not merely that
the rule imposed by the legislature be a rationally supportable one, but rather that the legislature's
actual telic judgment-i.e., its judgment that the particular (extraneous) rule will promote an
enumerated power end-be a rational telic judgment. The due process and equal protection
"rational basis" test indulges sheer speculation because underlying it is the presumption of
constitutionality, and the burden is on the challenger to rebut that presumption by showing that
no justification is rationally conceivable. In contrast, the Necessary and Proper Clause "rational
basis" test does not allow speculation because underlying it is the principle of enumerated powers,
and the burden is on the supporter of the federal law to establish some constitutional basis for it.
136. This amounts to a "plain statement" rule. As Justice Jackson pointed out in 1953, the
rule that thejudiciary should defer "to deliberate judgment by constitutional majorities of the two
Houses of Congress" is compelling "only when it appears that the precise point in issue here has
been considered by Congress and has been explicitly and deliberately resolved." United States
v. Five Gambling Devices, 346 U.S. 441, 449 (1953).
The predominant consideration is that we should be sure Congress has intentionally put
its power in issue by the legislation in question before we undertake a pronouncement
which may have far-reaching consequences upon the powers of Congress or the powers
reserved to the several States.
Id. at 447.
Even Justice Black acknowledged this. Explaining his refusal to join the majority's Necessary
and Proper Clause rationale in Polish National Alliance v. NLRB, Black declared that the requisite
congressional (or NLRB) judgment was not sufficiently apparent to him, and observed,
[I]n certain fact situations the federal government may find that regulation of purely
local and intrastate commerce is "necessary and proper" to prevent injury to interstate
commerce .... In applying this doctrine to particular situations this Court properly has
been cautious. . . . It has insisted upon "suitable regard to the principle that, whenever
the federal power is exerted within what would otherwise be the domain of state power,
the justification of the exercise of the federal power must clearly appear."
322 U.S. at 652-53 (concurring opinion, citations omitted).
For other applications of a "plain statement" rule, see, e.g., Wisconsin Public Intervenor v.
Mortier, 501 U.S. 597 (1991); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991); Will v. Michigan Dept.
of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989); Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242
(1985); Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 (1984).
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intensity of scrutiny under this clause should vary according to what
rights are affected by the particular exercise of it.' 37
These and other issues would have been confronted as the classic
enumerated powers analysis emerged from dual federalism's shadow
into the light of day. However, in 1944 the light was extinguished by
a cataclysmic Black-ness.
2. Hugo Black and the Reduction of Federalism to Politics
Hugo Black's crusading impatience with technical detail aborted
the jurisprudential recovery that Harlan Fiske Stone had led.
Contracts of indemnity, and the business of making and performing
them, had long been held not to be interstate commerce.' Conse-
quently, in upholding the application of the National Labor Relations
Act to labor practices at the Chicago headquarters of the Polish
National Alliance,' 39 the majority (which Justice Black did not join)
carefully pointed out that labor unrest attributable to those practices
would disrupt not merely the Alliance's insurance business itself, but
also its various other business activities-some of which were, and all
of which (the NLRB had found) "have a close, intimate, and substan-
tial relation to," interstate commerce. 4 ' To Black, however, this
careful distinction among the business activities of the Polish National
Alliance was wholly superfluous. Although he concurred that the
NLRA was applicable, he did so on the precedent-breaking premise
that the insurance business itself is commerce and is interstate
commerce when conducted across state lines.
Black elaborated on his reasoning in another insurance case
decided the same day. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters
Association involved the Sherman Act, and Justices Rutledge, Douglas,
and Murphy joined Black to make his view predominate among the
seven Justices participating in that case.' Black's reasoning por-
137. There is also this further criterion, which may materially assist the decision. Does
the proposed measure abridge a preexisting right of any State, or of any individual? If
it does not, there is a strong presumption in favour of its constitutionality, & slighter
relations to any declared object of the Constitution may be permitted to turn the scale.
Alexander Hamilton, Opinion on the United States Bank, in 8 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER
HAMILTON 97, 107 (Syrett ed. 1965).
138. Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. (75 U.S.) 168 (1869).
139. Polish National Alliance v. NLRB, 322 U.S. 643 (1944).
140. Polish National Alliance, 322 U.S. at 645-647.
141. 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
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tended far more than the immediate nationwide uproar over insurance
regulation that was its immediate effect.'42
To try distinguishing among the many acts performed in the
course of a business, Black said, would be to attempt "a metaphysical
separation."' 43 For nearly eight decades the Supreme Court had held"that insurance policies are mere personal contracts subject to the laws
of the state where executed. But this . . . rests upon a distinction
between what has been called 'local' and what 'interstate,"' and Black
deprecated that distinction as "a type of mechanical criterion." ''
Certainly by the 1940s, no Justice-and no one else who understood
the Necessary and Proper Clause-conceived that characterizing
something as "local" instead of "interstate" could prevent Congress
from reaching it insofar as it might be regulated "for carrying into
execution" an enumerated power, but that was not enough for Justice
Black. He insisted that "the entire transaction, of which that contract
is but a part .... may be a chain of events which becomes interstate
commerce."145
Thus, instead of the Necessary and Proper Clause, Black invoked
the Commerce Clause itself.146  To reason otherwise, he maintained,
would be to treat "the Congressional power over commerce among the
states as a 'technical legal conception." 147 He said the criterion must
not be the "mechanical" distinction between intrastate activities and
interstate commerce, "but rather whether, in each case, the competing
demands of the state and national interests involved can be accommo-
dated";14' and on this question there should be "differences in
judgment" from "different members of the Court," because the
question "must depend upon considered evaluation of competing
Constitutional objectives. ' 149
Chief Justice Stone in dissent, joined by Justice Frankfurter (who
had written for the majority in Polish National Alliance), answered with
142. The holding in South-Eastern Underwriters Association imperiled the insurance
regulatory system of every state. Congress responded with the McCarran Act, upheld in
Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 406 (1946), consenting to state regulation and
taxation of the insurance industry notwithstanding it might be deemed interstate commerce.
143. South-Eastern Underuriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. at 537.
144. Id. at 546.
145. Id. at 547.
146. By thus treating restraint of any part of the insurance business as a restraint of
interstate commerce itself, Justice Black made the Sherman Act applicable to the conspiracy to
fix premium rates, rig agents' commissions, and monopolize insurance marketing. Id. at 549.
147. Id. at 547.
148. Id. at 548.
149. Id. at 549 n.31.
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a lucid articulation of the essential constitutional distinction that Black
had chosen to ignore."' Even more telling, however, was the
scathing excoriation published three months later by the most widely
respected constitutional law scholar of that day, Harvard's Thomas
Reed Powell: "When a judge with the neat intellectual skill of Mr.
Justice Black proves lame and peccable in reasoning, it is an argument
pro homine rather than ad hominem to suggest that the trouble lies in
the illegitimacy of the design."1S
Black had said of insurance that "most persons, speaking from
common knowledge, would instantly say that of course such a business
is engaged in trade and commerce";"2 but Powell replied,
Many if not most persons, speaking from common knowledge,
would all too instantly say a lot of things that a trained lawyer
would know were based on technical ignorance rather than on
technical knowledge. The classic statement on the difference
between common and uncommon knowledge is in the answer given
to King James by Lord Coke when he said that "causes which
concern the life, or inheritance, or goods, or fortunes of his subjects,
are not to be decided by natural reason but by the artificial reason
and judgment of law, which law is an act which requires long study
150. "These principles," Stone emphasized, "are not peculiar to insurance contracts. They
are equally applicable to other types of contracts" and a multitude of other activities:
The mere formation of a contract to sell and deliver cotton or coal or crude rubber is
not in itself an interstate transaction and does not involve any act of interstate commerce
because cotton, coal and crude rubber are subjects of interstate or foreign commerce, or
because in fact performance of the contract may not be effected without some precedent
or subsequent movement interstate of the commodities sold, or because there may be
incidental use of the facilities of interstate commerce or transportation in the formation
of the contract. ...
Undoubtedly contracts ... may become the implements for restraints in marketing,
... and when so used may for that reason be within the Sherman Act.... But it is
quite another matter to say that the contracts are themselves interstate commerce or that
restraints in competition as to their terms or conditions are within the Sherman Act, in
the absence of a showing that the purpose or effect is to restrain competition in the
marketing of goods or services to which the contracts relate. ...
The practice of law [for example] is not commerce, .... and it does not become so
because a law firm attracts clients from without the state or sends its members or juniors
to other states to argue cases, or because its clients use the interstate mails to pay their
fees.
South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, at 569-70, 573 (Stone, C.J., dissenting).
151. Thomas Reed Powell, Insurance as Commerce, 57 HARV. L. REV. 937, 1008 (1944).
152. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. at 542-43.
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and experience, before that a man can attain to the cognizance of
it."l13
... The common knowledge of persons untrained in the law
is a precarious mentor of legal postulates and differentiations ...
Granted that in dealing with novel issues there are more open spaces
in constitutional law than in the more tightly articulated private law,
there is still appropriate in public law an instinct of lawyership
which the experts of a high profession should strive to respect and
to possess.154
What Justice Black "really seems to be doing," Powell fumed, is
beclouding all long recognized distinctions, condemning them by
calling them "mechanical," and rejecting them for a sort of free-for-
all test or lack of test of "whether, in each case, the competing
demands of the state and national interests involved can be
accommodated."
It may be seriously questioned whether there is wisdom in
applying the word "test" to such a vague conception as the
accommodation of the competing demands of state and national
interests. The phrase does well enough to summarize the varied
particularities incident to the judicial umpiring of the federal system;
but a blanket summary is not a test. Among the applications
embraced by the summary there are subordinate analyses and
judgments and lines of demarcation that afford a frame of reference
amounting to a recognizable structural system and confining judicial
judgment and discretion within measurable bounds .... ."'
In the constitutional law casebooks, however, this passionate
controversy has been utterly ignored. Dowling's third edition,
published two years after the Polish National Alliance decision,
mentioned South-Eastern Underwriters Association only in passing, and
deprecated the Justices' disagreement as based "primarily on grounds
of statutory interpretation"' 6 -although Dowling did note (without
elaboration) that it "stirred up a new set of problems centering on the
commerce clause."'5 7 Rottschaefer's 1948 casebook mentioned it not
at all, except as one in a long string of citations in a note after Gibbons
1S3. Powell's quotation was from Prohibitions del Roy, 12 Co. 63, 65, 77 Eng. Rep. 1342,
1343 (1607).
154. Powell, supra note 151, at 987-88.
155. Id. at 994-95.
156. NOEL T. DOWLING, CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 292 (3d ed. 1946).
157. Id. at 618. Dowling used South-Eastern Underwriters Association merely as the occasion
for noting Congress's consent to continued state regulation of insurance by the McCarran Act,
later upheld in Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946).
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v. Ogden.' Dodd's fourth edition in 1949 printed portions of
Black's opinion, but none of Stone's dissent or Powell's scathing
critique. Moreover, Dodd's placement of the case relative to others
included in his subchapter on the scope of national power over
interstate commerce suggests that already, just three years after Chief
Justice Stone's sudden death, l"9 the academics were once again
hopelessly conflating the issues under the Commerce and Necessary
and Proper Clauses.
By the 1960s, what Professor Powell decried as Black's "free-for-
all ... accommodation of the competing demands of state and national
interests" had become the orthodox approach to federalism issues. The
casebooks not only acquiesced, but actually led, in what Noel Dowling
in 1959 described, in his sixth edition preface, as the "trend towards
treating the distribution of powers between the Nation and the States
as essentially a political question." 6' Nobody mentioned, and it was
soon forgotten, that the crucial event in this revolution was not the
fancied 1937 "switch in time that saved nine," but rather Justice
Black's 1944 abrogation of the newly recovered classic distinction
between the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause.
It soon became fashionable to maintain that the time for federal-
ism in the United States had passed.' However, many still value
the freedom, and the opportunity for initiative, facilitated by federal-
ism's decentralization of political discretion. The benefits of federalism
cannot be effectively preserved by ad hoc accommodation of "the
158. HENRY ROTTSCHAEFER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 272
(1948),
159. On April 22, 1946, while announcing his dissent in Girouard v. United States, 318 U.S.
61 (1946), Stone suffered a cerebral hemorrhage. Justice Black, as senior Associate Justice,
(ironically) recessed the last session of Stone's tenure, and the Chief was taken home, where that
evening he died. Stone was past seventy-three, and nine years of contending with Black and the
other "wild horses" appointed by FDR had taken a toll. Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin,
the case that would ratify Congress's undoing of the most immediate consequence of Black's 4-3
revolution in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association, 322 U.S. 533 (1944), had
been argued March 8 and 11 and was still under advisement when Stone died. 328 U.S. 408
(1946).
160. NOEL T. DOWLING, CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW xiv (6th ed. 1959).
161. For example, one ex-New Deal "brain truster" wrote in 1974 that "Federalism, as
such, belongs to a temporary historical era.... In the end it must find its resolution in union."
REXFORD G. TUGWELL, THE EMERGING CONSTITUTION 125 (1974).
The Union no longer possesses only enumerated powers; it possesses all powers-de
facto if not de jure-if they are necessary. They will be acquired by administration, or,
if it is more convenient, by judicial invention. ...
... This situation may go on being called federalism, partly from habit, but largely
to mist over the extension of central power.
Id. at 122.
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competing demands of the state and national interests.' 162 It requires
(to use the words of Thomas Reed Powell), "subordinate analyses and
judgments and lines of demarcation that afford a frame of reference
amounting to a recognizable structural system and confining judicial
judgment and discretion within measurable bounds.' 1 63 It requires,
in other words, some discernible, cogent, and functional federalism
"law."
IV. THE FEDERALISM REVIVAL CHALLENGING
CASEBOOKS TODAY
The Supreme Court has begun trying to reinvigorate the
constitutional law of federalism. However, it has had to do so with
little sophisticated help from the bar and almost none from the law
professoriat; the casebooks have done little to help prepare students to
participate in the years of development and refinement ahead in the
law of federalism. Unsurprisingly, therefore, the results of the Justices'
labors in federalism law so far are not very clear or cogent.
United States v. Lopez provides several examples in the compass
of a single case."' For one, Chief Justice Rehnquist's taxonomy of
the "commerce power"-recited now as an incantation in virtually
every lower discussion of "commerce power" issues165 is positively
dysfunctional. The precedents involving "persons or things in
interstate commerce" are certainly Commerce Clause cases; but the
"instrumentalities" cases (which Rehnquist placed with them in his
second Lopez category) are Necessary and Proper Clause cases. So also
are the "affecting" cases which Rehnquist set apart in category
three-as well as some of the "channel" cases, which constitute his
category one. It is as if a zoologist were to describe vertebrates as
comprising three groups: herbivores, mammals and primates.
Classification like this does not illuminate; it obfuscates. It reflects and
perpetuates deficient analysis. It obscures the very similarities and
differences that are crucial not only to understanding but also to the
utility of classification itself.
The Lopez majority's emphasis on "substantiality" is important
and well-founded,166 but the Justices have not yet focused the issue
162. This is the phrase Justice Black used in South-Eastern Underwriters Association, 322
U.S. at 548.
163. Powell, supra note 151, at 988.
164. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
165. Id. at 552-59.
166. See, e.g., National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S.
1, 37 (1937) (cited in Lopez); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (cited in Lopez). See also
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well. There is a crucial difference between a particular provision of law
that substantially affects interstate commerce (even though it applies
to a local activity), and a local activity that substantially affects
interstate commerce (even though the particular provision of law
applied to it does nothing for interstate commerce at all). The latter
gives no basis for a credible constitutional rationale;.67 the former
certainly does-but not by virtue of the Commerce Clause.
Recognizing "substantiality" as a Necessary and Proper Clause
issue-one that bears on the suitability of means to an end-should
suggest that the "substantiality" of a particular regulation's impact on
interstate commerce is just as crucial in the "instrumentality" cases
(included within Rehnquist's second Lopez category) as it is for laws
regulating manufactures, for example (included within the third
category): the mere fact that, for example, automobiles commonly
serve as "instrumentalities" of interstate commerce cannot give
Congress plenary power over cars1-or power even to make armed
carjacking a federal crime.'69
On the other hand, once "substantiality" is recognized as a
Necessary and Proper Clause issue and not a Commerce Clause issue,
it should be apparent that Rehnquist spoke too restrictively when he
said in Lopez that "[w]here economic activity substantially affects
Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 196 n.27 (1968). The word "substantial" is not necessarily
definitive of the concept; see Hodel v. Virginia, 452 U.S. 264 (1981). However, the word
"significant" Justice Breyer substituted in his Lopez dissent seems (at least in connotation) too
disparaging of the requirement. 514 U.S. at 615-16 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
167. Nonetheless, only five days after the Lopez decision, the Justices per curiam and without
dissent, upheld a RICO conviction for investing the proceeds of certain crimes in the operations
of a mine. United States v. Robertson, 514 U.S. 669 (1995). In several respects the mine
operations either were in, or affected, interstate commerce. However, apparently no one thought
to ask what interstate commerce policy was served by the particular law being applied, which
prohibited investment in those operations only if the invested funds derived from certain crimes.
Prohibiting the investment of proceeds from certain activities might help to deter those
activities; and if Congress had power to criminalize those activities (and did so), the investment
prohibition could be justified as helping to effectuate that power. On that rationale, however, it
would be silly (even though not unconstitutional) to limit the investment prohibition to
investments in activities that are "in or affecting interstate commerce," because prohibiting any
investment of such proceeds would be an even better means of deterring the crimes. On the other
hand, no end for interstate commerce itself is served by the investment prohibition RICO actually
imposes.
168. Of course Congress can, for example, prohibit interstate shipment of cars that are not
designed or equipped as it desires, regardless of why it desires them to be so designed and
equipped. That is a function of its plenary power over interstate shipping (commerce)--which
in no way depends on whether cars are "instrumentalities" of interstate commerce.
169. Contrast the Court of Appeals cases upholding the federal carjacking statute (the Anti
Car Theft Act of 1992, 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1994)) in, for example, United States v. Bishop, 66
F.3d 569 (3d Cir. 1995) and United States v. Oliver, 60 F.3d 547 (9th Cir. 1995).
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interstate commerce, legislation regulating that activity will be
sustained."'7 °  The arguable limitation to matters "economic" in
character inheres only in the Commerce Clause end, not in the means:
certainly Congress can regulate even non-economic acts if doing so
substantially serves its interstate commerce policy ends.'
At the end of the last term, two years after Lopez, seven Justices
agreed in imposing a "congruence and proportionality" restriction upon
Congress's power under the Fourteenth Amendment's Enforcement
Clause.' Of course, that Enforcement Clause (and those in other
amendments) was expressly conceived, and has always been construed,
in strict analogy to the Necessary and Proper Clause. 3 It therefore
170. 514 U.S. at 560 (emphasis added).
171. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964)
(discrimination under Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S.
294 (same) (1964).
172. City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997). Justice Kennedy wrote the majority
opinion; Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Stevens, Thomas, and Ginsburg joined in all of that
opinion; and Justice Scalia joined in most of it, including the part referred to here. Although
Justice O'Connor dissented on other points, she expressly affirmed the majority's "congruence
and proportionality" rule, which she quoted. The dissenting opinions of Justices Souter and
Breyer did not address this point.
173. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 438-444 (1968); Katzenbach v.
Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966) ("[T]he McCulloch v. Maryland standard is the measure of
what constitutes 'appropriate legislation' under sec. 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment"); see also,
e.g., Lambert v. Yellowley, 272 U.S. 581 (1926).
In 1966, Archibald Cox claimed the cases since 1937 "dealing with congressional power to
regulate interstate commerce" as the "chief legal antecedents" of the majority's second rationale
in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966). See Archibald Cox, The Supreme Court, 1965
Term-Foreward: Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARV. L.
REV. 91, 107 (1966). By that rationale, a rationally based congressional conclusion that
conditioning voting on English literacy violates "equal protection" concludes the constitutional
issue despite judicial precedent to the contrary. But when that so-called "Morgan power" was put
forward to support lowering the voting age by statute, I pointed out Cox's error: those cases did
not represent deference to Congress' estimate of its power under the Commerce Clause (which
would be like deference to its view of the Equal Protection Clause), but rather illustrated the
deference always accorded Congress' selection of means (even if extraneous) toward ends the
judiciary deems within some enumerated power. They were therefore the "chief legal
antecedents" not of its second, but only of Morgan's first rationale. See David E. Engdahl,
Constitutionality of the Voting Age Statute, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 15-21 (1970).
The voting-age statute passed Congress on the presumed strength of the "Morgan power"
thesis; but when it was tested, apparently Justice Harlan's Morgan critique and my own, supra,
prevailed, and none of the Justices in Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970), employed
Morgan's second rationale. (Not even its author, Justice Brennan, did so; instead, he tendered a
very different notion in its name.)
Nonetheless, Constitutional Law casebooks for over two decades struggled to make some
variation of Morgan's second rationale seem credible. Thus, when the Supreme Court in 1990
took a disputed view of the Free Exercise Clause, there was immediate and widespread support
for Congress's invocation of the so-called "Morgan power" by the so-called Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a) (1994). The Court's forceful repudiation of the "Morgan
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would seem that a major step has already been taken-by a vote of
seven Justices-toward further curtailing runaway "affecting com-
merce" jurisprudence. Unless for the first time in history someone
should contrive a material distinction between the Enforcement and
Necessary and Proper Clauses, it would seem that Congress's power
under the latter (e.g., to make laws regulating local activities) should
be held limited to laws that are congruent and proportional to the
enumerated power objective (e.g., congruent and proportional to the
goal for interstate commerce at which they are aimed). It will be
interesting to see how many constitutional law casebooks apprise
students of this possibility.
The Lopez majority's emphasis on the "commercial" focus of the
Commerce Clause was appropriate. However, the Justices do not yet
seem ready to reconsider the deviant line of cases begun a century ago
that treated plainly noncommercial acts as if they were "commerce"
merely because state lines were crossed.174 Indeed, two of the five
Justices in the majority intimated the contrary by asserting an
"immense stake in the stability of our Commerce Clause jurisprudence
as it has evolved to this point."' 75
Some casebooks prompt students to consider whether congressio-
nal "purpose" should matter in exercising the "commerce power." No
casebook even intimates, however, that the answer might depend on
the distinction emphasized here. Congress's power under the
Commerce Clause itself is plenary, so that "purpose" cannot matter;
that is why the Lottery Act,'76 the Child Labor Act,'77 and the
interstate shipping prohibition of the Fair Labor Standards Act'78
were valid. However, when the law applies to something that is not
itself interstate commerce, it is Congress's power under the Necessary
and Proper Clause that is being used instead, and that clause has a
power" in City of Boerne v. Flores 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997), seems to me to demonstrate the
Justices' sharpened awareness of the distinction between construing the terms of the Constitution
and deferring to congressional judgment as to means-whether under an Enforcement Clause, or
under the Necessary and Proper Clause which is their analog.
174. See, e.g., Covington & Cincinnati Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 154 U.S. 204 (1894); see
also Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917); Thornton v. United States, 271 U.S. 414
(1926); United States v. Simpson, 252 U.S. 465 (1920).
175. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 574 (Kennedy, J., joined by O'Connor, J., concurring).
176. The Court's holding in Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903), was sound despite
the majority opinion's confused rationale.
177. A majority held this Act invalid in Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918); but
that holding, of course, was wrong, and the dissent was correct. See United States v. Darby, 312
U.S. 100 (1941).
178. See Darby, 312 U.S. at 112-17.
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"purpose" requirement-" for carrying into Execution"1 79-built in.
That is why the Sherman Act,1 ° the production controls of the 1938
Agricultural Adjustment Act, 81 the factory wage and hour provisions
of the Fair Labor Standards Act,182 and the race discrimination
prohibition in the 1964 Civil Rights Act,183 for example, all depend-
ed entirely on the purpose of advancing Congress's will for interstate
commerce (regardless whether other purposes simultaneously were
served).
The dissenters in Lopez posited "a merely implicit congressional
judgment"'84 about affecting interstate commerce. They loosed their
imaginations to speculate about what Congress "could have
thought, 1 85 asserting that "rational possibility is the touchstone"18 6
of "the scope of the commerce power as this Court has understood that
power over the last half-century." ' 7  They were wrong however in
calling this "a paradigm of judicial restraint. '  The rational-basis
review employed in other contexts is different, and one must resist the
subversion of legal analysis that easily results from using the same
words.
When, for example, a classification is made by a law that the
government otherwise has power to make, unless the distinction is
invidious or affects some constitutionally favored interest the law will
be upheld "if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that
could provide a rational basis for the classification .... Where there
are 'plausible reasons' . . . 'our inquiry is at an end.' . . . This
standard of review is a paradigm of judicial restraint."' 89 But where
the very existence of the power is at issue, such a rule is a paradigm not
of restraint but of judicial arrogation. The principle of enumerated
powers precludes any presumption of validity for a federal measure not
unmistakably premised on some enumerated power, and to premise
anything on the Necessary and Proper Clause requires a sufficient telic
179. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
180. See, e.g., Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 75 U.S. 211 (1899).
181. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
182. See Darby, 312 U.S. at 117-23.
183. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach
v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
184. 514 U.S. at 603 (Souter, J., dissenting).
185. Id. at 619 (Breyer, J., joined by Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ.).
186. Id. at 614 (Souter, J., dissenting).
187. Id. at 615 (Breyer, J. joined by Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ.).
188. Id. at 604 (Souter, J., dissenting).
189. Federal Communications Commission v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307
(1993).
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link. From the beginning it has been deemed "the right of the
legislature to exercise its best judgment in the selection of measures to
carry into execution the constitutional powers of the government,"' 90
and therefore that judgment by Congress is the indispensable requisite
of this power. It is that actual judgment by Congress, not some
judicial conjecture, that must be found rationally based. The presence
or absence of formal findings is an unreliable indication of whether the
requisite congressional judgment actually has been made; 191 however,
even in the 1940s and 1950s a "plain statement" rule regarding the
Necessary and Proper Clause was employed. 9 2
The judiciary must inquire whether the particular provision of law
(incorporating a national bank, for example, or regulating local
activities in some way) "is really calculated to effect any of the objects
entrusted to the [federal] government."' 93  For the court to require
that Congress have calculated aright-that Congress's judgment be not
only rational, but correct-would be "to tread on legislative
ground."' 94  By the same token, however, for the judiciary to
postulate telic connections where Congress has not manifested its own
calculus of means to end, would no less certainly be to tread on
legislative ground. It is Congress's prerogative---or rather, it is
Congress's duty-to exercise that judgment.
Getting to the nub of it, the Constitution entitles the people to
have their electorally answerable political organs actually and openly
inquire, debate, compromise, and resolve whether and how far it is
necessary to reach matters otherwise beyond the national government's
scope, in order to effectuate enumerated federal powers. Requiring
190. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 420 (1819) (emphasis added).
191. Express findings themselves, of course, can be a sham. For example, the gun control
provisions enacted as Title VII of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub.
L. No. 90-351, § 1202(a), 82 Stat. 236 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1203, repealed by Pub. L.
No. 99-308, § 104(b), 100 Stat. 459 (1986)), recite a conclusional finding that firearms possession
by dishonorably discharged veterans (as well as felons, mental incompetents, and illegal aliens)
"constitutes ... a burden on commerce or threat affecting the free flow of commerce." However,
these provisions were introduced as a floor amendment in the Senate and received very little floor
discussion, no attention at any hearings, and no committee attention. The amendment passed the
Senate when a vote was abruptly called only a week after its introduction. See 114 CONG. REC.
14772-14775 (1968). In the House, Title VII was barely mentioned when the Omnibus bill was
discussed, see 114 CONG. REC. 16286, 16298 (1968). Its enactment almost surely was
attributable more to outrage over the shootings of Martin Luther King and Robert Kennedy in
the preceding days, than to any rational inquiry or judgment about guns, veterans, aliens, felons,
and interstate commerce.
192. See note 136 supra.
193. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 423 (1819) (emphasis added).
194. Id. at 423. This was the mistake made by the majority in Hepburn v. Griswold, 8
Wall. (75 U.S.) 603 (1870), overruled in Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. (79 U.S.) 4S7 (1871).
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Congress actually to make a rationally based telic judgment when it
regulates things otherwise beyond its reach, provides some modest
assurance that the political branches will perform with fair diligence the
work they are constituted to do. When judges indulgently speculate
about telic links that Congress might or might not have perceived and
acted upon, they subvert the Constitution by discharging Congress
from its responsibility to deliberate seriously about the restraint in
national lawmaking on which a viable federalism depends. The
considerations underlying the "rational basis test" employed in "due
process" and "equal protection" contexts are just not analogous at all.
The preceding paragraphs have centered on the Lopez case
because of the prominence that case enjoys-and because it involves
the particular federalism issues limned here from the Blackness of
1944. There are other illustrations, however, of how deficient and
tentative the seeming resurgence of federalism law still is. For
example, only three months before Lopez, a majority held the Federal
Arbitration Act applicable to an Alabama homeowner's contract with
a termite exterminator, deeming it sufficient to obviate the constitu-
tional issue that the exterminator did business in other states, too, and
"the termite-treating and house-repairing material used ... came from
outside Alabama"! 95 There were concurring and dissenting opin-
ions, but none addressed this point; yet the herpes theory that federal
power forever infects anything that contacts interstate commerce is
surely too absurd to survive exposure!'96
There is a nonsense opinion from 1948197 (unsurprisingly by
Justice Black) which, by its total lack of rationale in a case on
comparable facts, gives colorable credence to this herpes theory when
195. Allied Bruce Terminix Companies, Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995).
196. An equivalent "virus" theory persists-for lack of critical reflection by lawyers,
professors, and judges-with regard to federal grant funds. See, e.g., the cases discussed in David
E. Engdahl, The Spending Power, 44 DUKE L.J. 1, 72-75 (1994). One particularly significant and
constantly utilized statute that appears to rest upon this stupid notion is the "federal program
bribery provision," 18 U.S.C. § 666 (1994), critiqued in George D. Brown, Stealth
Statute-Corruption, The Spending Power, and the Rise of 18 U.S.C. § 666, 73 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 247 (1998).
197. United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689 (1948). In Sullivan the Court held that the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act could constitutionally be applied to an act of misbranding
drugs which had previously crossed state lines, even though a subsequent intrastate transaction
had intervened and even though there was absolutely no suggestion that the local misconduct had
(or could possibly have had) any effect upon interstate commerce at all. Id. at 695-96.
Congress subsequently amended the Act to make unambiguous its application in comparable
circumstances; and when it did so it provided in the legislative history of the amendment some
credible Necessary and Proper Clause rationales. There was none of that, however, in the law
or its history as they stood at the time of the Sullivan decision; and there was no hint of any such
rationale in the Court's opinion in Sullivan.
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subjected to no intelligent reflection at all. Almost every one of us,
and almost everything in the modern marketplace, has crossed a state
line sometime. Can that entail federal omnicompetence? Balderdash.
Certainly some particular regulations applying to goods after they cease
being in interstate commerce can be justified under the Necessary and
Proper Clause by sufficient telic links to some policy of Congress for
interstate commerce; the case Justice Black mistakenly claimed as
support for his 1948 opinion"'8 is just one of many easy illustrations.
But to think the mere fact of prior interstate transit, per se, entails
present federal power, is a ridiculous failure of understanding that
merits only guffaws.
198. McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 115 (1913). In McDermott, the federal law
prohibited the interstate shipment of syrup not bearing certain labeling on each can inside the
crate, and also contained a provision permitting the Government to enforce that regulation by
inspection of the cans after unpacking, even long after the interstate commerce was completed.
The Court held that this enforcement provision was constitutional under the Necessary and
Proper Clause, and that a state law interfering with that chosen means of enforcement was
preempted. Id. at 131. The inspection provision was a means of enforcing the rule regarding the
labeling required during interstate commerce, and the fact that the rule regarding the labels on
the individual cans inside the shipping crates during interstate shipment was itself calculated to
protect consumers (on the assumption that changing those labels would probably remain after
shipment), was irrelevant: since Congress's power over interstate commerce itself is plenary, it
can control the labeling during shipment for whatever reasons it might choose (or for no
discernible reason at all). Id.
The situation in the Sullivan case was entirely different. There, an act of misbranding
occurring after shipment was held reachable, not because it was thought to be a means of
preventing misbranding in (or the shipment of misbranded goods in) interstate commerce, but
simply because it was deemed helpful toward the nice but extraneous (i.e., nonenumerated power)
end at which the Act's regulation of interstate commerce itself was aimed: consumer protection.
Cf. United States v. Urbuteit, 335 U.S. 355, 358 (1948) ("The problem is a practical one of
consumer protection, not dialectics.") The Necessary and Proper Clause, however, simply does
not work as constitutional justification for means to such extraneous ends.
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Some recent statutes'9 9 and several lower court opinions20 0
uncritically assume this herpes theory. Other recent statutes evidence
an equally preposterous, hocus pocus notion of Congress's "commerce
power," as if murmuring mystic incantations about "total inci-
dence""'' or "nexus"' or "jurisdictional element"2 3 or "affecting
commerce" should serve in lieu of identifying enumerated-power ends
and seriously assessing particular regulations as means.20 4
The Chief Justice emphasized once again in his 1997 Year-End
Report of the Federal Judiciary the very serious practical damage done
by the increasing "federalization" of crime, in terms of case backlogs,
oppressive judicial workloads, and the distraction of energy and
attention from "the traditional role of the federal judiciary." 205 A
significant part of the remedy, however, is in the judiciary's own hand:
many of the objectionable statutes have been enacted within the past
ten years (and most within the past twenty), and many could not
survive if subjected to the kind of federalism law scrutiny suggested
here. As another federal judge wrote a short time ago,
199. E.g., the Anti Car Theft Act of 1992, 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1994).
Sometimes the influence of this ridiculous herpes theory induces Congress pointlessly to
restrict an important statute's reach. For example, Congress need not have restricted the 1964
Civil Rights Act to restaurants that serve food products from out of state, because race
discrimination by restaurants surely has the same impact on interstate business travel, for
example, regardless of where the food served might come from. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379
U.S. 294 (1964).
200. See, e.g., United States v. Lewis, 100 F.3d 49 (7th Cir. 1996) ("A single journey across
state lines, however remote from the defendant's possession, is enough to establish the
constitutionally minimal tie of a given weapon to interstate commerce."). Other cases under the
felon firearm possession statute--e.g., United States v. Hanna, 55 F.3d 1456 (9th Cir. 1995);
United States v. Sorentino, 72 F.3d 294 (2d Cir. 1995)-attribute this herpes rationale to
Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563 (1977). However, the Court in Scarborough addressed
only a statutory construction issue, and did not address at all the constitutional question-which
had seemed so troubling in United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971)-that the Justices had
strained the statute in order to avoid it.
201. See Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154 (1971).
202. See Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563, 564 (1977).
203. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995).
204. See the proceeds investment provision of RICO discussed footnote 166 supra, and the
statutes involved in, e.g., United States v. Harris, 108 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 1997); United States
v. Leslie, 103 F.3d 1093 (1997); United States v. Clayton, 108 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 1997). See
also the application of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (1994), to the facts in United States
v. Harrington, 108 F.3d 1460 (D.C. Cir. 1997), and the application of the arson statute, 18
U.S.C. § 844(6) (1994), to the facts in, e.g., United States v. Stillwell, 900 F.2d 1104 (7th Cir.
1990), and United States v. Sherlin, 67 F.3d 1208 (6th Cir. 1995).
The rote phrase "in or affecting [interstate] commerce" has been used for years as a
jurisdictional conjuration in statutes having various purposes but no genuine commerce objectives.
205. See THE THIRD BRANCH, NEWSLETTER OF THE FEDERAL COURTS, (Federal Justice
Center, Wash. D.C.), Jan. 1988, at 1.
Seattle University Law Review
At every meeting of federal judges that I attend there is the
complaint that the Congress is broadening federal jurisdiction to the
point that we are unable to do our jobs. The historically unique
and discrete jurisdiction of the Federal Courts is being distorted.
The constant lament is that the constitutional concept of Federalism
is being eviscerated by the Congress. The Congress is able to do
this, however, only because we in the judicial branch are willing to
interpret the Commerce Clause of the Constitution so broadly.20 6
On the other hand, the frequent talismanic invocation of the
Tenth Amendment in discussions of federalism is evidence of the ever-
present danger of falling back into the error of dual federalism." 7
Indeed, it sometimes has seemed that Justice O'Connor has already
taken the plunge. Although her opinion in New York v. United
States °s is cogent in other respects, she invoked the dual-federalism
vision by positing domains of state and federal power as mirror
images of each other," ''  with the competence of each being a limit
to the other, so the limits of both could be discerned by examining
either, "just as a cup may be half empty or half full."21 A compe-
tent understanding of the Necessary and Proper Clause defies such
simplistic imagery. O'Connor also enthusiastically embraced21'
United States v. Butler,2"2 the 1936 case in which the Court nominal-
ly endorsed the classic Hamiltonian view of Congress's power to spend
and then, befuddled by the dual-federalism premises articulated by
Justice Roberts in his opinion for the Court, decided the case on
Madison's anti- Hamiltonian view instead.213
206. United States v. Cortner, 834 F. Supp. 242, 244 (M.D. Tenn. 1993) (Wiseman, D.J.).
207. The Tenth Amendment is very important. Its importance, however, is the emphasis
it places on the principle of enumerated powers. Of course, the power conferred by the Necessary
and Proper Clause is one of those powers enumerated as being delegated to Congress, and the
Tenth Amendment in no way restricts that or any other power delegated to the United States.
The scope and limitations of the several powers delegated to the United States are questions which
the Tenth Amendment simply, and quite plainly, does not address at all.
208. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
209. Id. at 156. "If a power is delegated to Congress in the Constitution, the Tenth
Amendment expressly disclaims any reservation of that power to the States; if a power is an
attribute of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment, it is necessarily a power the
Constitution has not conferred on Congress." Id.
210. Id. at 159.
211. Id. at 155-59.
212. 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
213. See David E. Engdahl, The Spending Power, 44 DUKE L.J. 1, 35-38 (1994).
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Constitutional Competency
IV. CONCLUSION
Dual federalism is a mistaken view of the Constitution that even
Justice Roberts outgrew. It already has proved incapable not only of
dissuading those who are predisposed toward generalized central
authority, but also of sustaining credibility among those who, like
Chief Justice Stone, have brains that impel them toward critical
analysis. Dual federalism can provide no effective protection should
the devil turn.214  On the other hand, the premise of latter-day
orthodoxy that consigns the protection of federalism to politics is also
unsustainable. If judges-or students--cut through the forest of
appellate opinions and examine the only United States Constitution
that anyone is sworn to uphold, 215 neither of these opposite errors
can endure. The real virtue of a written constitution, after all, is that
once in a while people actually read it with enough acumen to notice
the cogent paths it offers out of the dead ends into which the parades
of cases sometimes march.
Security for the federal system depends upon broadening the road
of competent understanding between the chasm of centralized
omnicompetence and dual federalism's abyss. Several Supreme Court
Justices have significantly begun undertaking this reconstruction. They
have resumed the work led by Chief Justice Stone until the Blackening
in 1944. Their commitment should alert the rest of the profession
that, where federalism is concerned, it is time to begin thinking like
lawyers again.
Federalism is a part of the constitutional skeleton, a framework of
structure and resistance upon and against which the muscles of politics
flex to do useful work. To abandon the structure itself to mere politics
is to alter the organism fundamentally. There are acceptable processes
for accomplishing such fundamental change; but neither pragmatic
accommodation, nor analytical failing on the part of those who make
law their profession; is among them. Not even social progress is well-
served when lawyers do their technical work badly.
It is a matter not of politics but of professional competence. Law
students need to develop constructive analytical skills here no less than
in fields of civil rights, land use, or international business. Unfortu-
nately, what seems almost characteristic of modern practice where
214. See ROBERT BOLT, A MAN FOR ALL SEASONS 37-38 (1962).
215. As to the effrontery of the contrary assertions in Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958),
see David E. Engdahl, John Marshall's Jeffersonian' Concept of Judicial Review, 42 DUKE L.J. 279
(1992).
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federalism is involved is a failure even to perceive crucial issues.
Conditioning students not only to notice issues of federalism law, but
also to competently analyze them and contribute constructively to this
field's development, is a challenge to which the constitutional law
casebooks have not yet sufficiently responded.
